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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of the effect which

t~e

commercialization of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) will have on
the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Caribbean, and the extent
to which boundary disputes will reduce the area available for OTEC facility deployment there.

The first chapter is a discussion of OTEC and the

prospects for commercialization in the next ten to fifteen years.

The

second chapter is an analysis of the development of the international law
of the sea, and how that evolution has stabilized in recent years establishing a jurisdictional regime in which coastal states control the
resources within 200 miles of their shores. The third chapter demonstrates
how the international community has 'been unsuccessful at establishing a
systematic body of rules for the delimitation of maritime boundaries.
This lack of agreement creates the potential for boundary disputes to
persist for many years, especially where the boundary results in the
apportionment of valuable resources.

The implications of these

developments for the commercialization of OTEC in the Caribbean in
particular are discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters.
In the Caribbean, which is endowed throughout with an OTEC resource,
no maritime space exists further than 200 miles from some continental or·
insular territory.

As a result, the entire region will be within zones

of national jurisdiction. As many as 60 maritime boundaries will have to

ii

be delimited, many of which will require the consideration of a unique or
special circumstance such as the presence of a remote island or an
unusual curvature of the coastline.

The issues are complicated in some

cases by disputed titles to sovereignty over small, uninhabited or
sparsely populated islands.
Nine dispute areas are identified which affect maritime zones of
varying size and significance.

The thesis includes original maps of the

areas discussed. These are the known disputes, many of which have been
dormant for a number of years, which represent the most immediate
constraint to early OTEC commercialization. The list is not final and
absolute, however, because there are numerous areas where no activity
concerning the delimitation process has occurred.

The potential exists

for a dispute to arise in any undelimited boundary region, especially
when the countries involved become aware of the increased economic value
of the area resulting from OTEC development.

In planning a commerciali-

zation strategy for OTEC in the Caribbean, the potential for these new
disputes must also be considered in addition to those identified in this
study.

iii
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Introduction
Over the past decade there has been ongoing development of alternative
energy sources to replace the increasingly costly conventional sources
such as coal and oil. Among the more promising large scale renewable
energy options which have emerged is Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion,
known as OTEC. This is a "sol ar" technology in that it uses warm ocean
surface water (heated by the sun) and
electricity.

col~er

deep water to produce

Based upon fulfillmeRt of the development program planned

by the Department of Energy in combination with a recent legislative
mandate, OTEC would be expected to become commercially viable within the
next ten years.
During the 1960's and 1970's, ocean resources such as fisheries and
offshore oil were becoming more valuable as worldwide demand increased.
As more countries unilaterally extended their offshore claims, partially
in an effort to secure a broader resource base, the law of the sea was
forced into a period of rapid transition.

Consequently, the number and

importance of maritime boundaries increased correspondingly.
Historically, maritime boundary disputes have become prolonged when
the delimitation results in the apportionment of valuable fishery or oil
resources.

The effect of such disputes has generally been that neither

party is able to fully exploit the resource potential of the area in
question until the issue is resolved by agreement or via some third party
settlement such as arbitration or World Court decision.

Where the

delimitation does not involve any known resources, countries have either
agreed to a boundary without much conflict or have disregarded the

2

question altogether.
The advent of OTEC as a viable and valuable energy source will create
another reason for countries to become more assertive in their maritime
claims. Maritime areas which previously had little economic value may
become the key to energy and economic independence for many developing
countries. The realization of the economic potential in OTEC off their
shores will stimulate nations to bring the boundary issue to resolution, but at the same time it will make that resolution more difficult to
attain.

These countries will become more reluctant to negotiate away

what they might view as their rightful maritime space.

As a result,

maritime boundary disputes in areas of OTEC potential will often become
more prolonged with the negative effect of increasing the risk to OTEC
facility deployment in those areas.
In the Caribbean Sea there is a vast OTEC potential; every country
which has access to waters deeper than 700 meters or so will be able to
produce electricity from the sea.

Based upon recent developments in the

law of the sea, the entire region will be within zones of national jurisdiction.

However, the process of maritime boundary delimitation is only

partially completed in that area.

In addition, a number of small islands

and cays have historically been claimed by more than one country,
although in most cases these disputes have been essentially dormant
because of the islands' low economic value.

The prospect of OTEC is

likely to bring many of these issues to the surface in the upcoming
decade, with the resultant effect that OTEC commercialization will be
constrained in those disputed areas.

The purpose of this thesis is to

identify those areas as an aid to the development of an OTEC
commercialization strategy for the Caribbean.

3

CHAPTER 1
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion

A.

History of OTEC.
The concept of utilizing temperature differences in the ocean to

produce power was first discussed by the French physicist, Arsene
d'Arsonval as early as 1882. 1 In the late 1920's another Frenchman,
Georges Claude, constructed a .land based ocean thermal plant on the coast
of Cuba, generating 22 KW of electricity.

This project was only a

limited success, however, because the plant produced less power than it
used to pump the water, and after the loss of several cold water pipes
the project was abandoned.

During subsequent years two further attempts

by the French to construct OTEC facilities met with insurmountable
technological and economic barriers. 2 The availability of lower cost
energy options such as hydroelectric and oil impeded continued development of OTEC.
Interest in OTEC was rekindled in the early 1970's by the lIenergy
cri~is,1I

this time in the United States.

Federal support for research

and development increased rapidly at first (from $85,000 in 1972 to $36
million in 1978) and then levelled off at about $40 million per year. 3
The OTEC program for fiscal year 1982 was threatened with fatal bUdget
cuts when the present Administration announced its fiscal and energy
policies, however a reduced budget of $20.8 million has been approved.
Of this sum, $6.3 million earmarked for Phase 1 (conceptual design) of
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the pilot plants. 4 The OTEC community is now trying to attract private
funding for continued accelerated development.

Japanese, French, and

other European interests are also conducting OTEC programs of their own.
Since the initiation of the U.S. OTEC program in 1972, several
milestones have been reached which bring OTEC closer to commercial
realization.

In the summer of 1979, the Mini-OTEC barge, sited off

Hawaii, demonstrated for the first time in history that net power could
be produced from ocean temperature differences.

This privately and state

funded project, while small in scale (50 KW gross, 10-15 KW net), provided
a large impetus for accelerating development toward conunercial OTEC,
resulting ultimately in the passage of both a Research, Development, and
Demonstration Act (Public Law 96-310), and a Regulatory, Promotional, and
Licensing Act (Public Law 96-320).5 The purpose of Public Law 96-310
is to "accelerate ••• development to provide a technical base for meeting,"
among other things, national goals of 500 MW to be demonstrated by 1989,
and 10,000 MW commercial capacity by 1999. 6 The OTEC Act of 1980, PL
96-320, identifies NOAA as the lead licensing agency, authorizes and
calls
for early development of regulations and streamlined one stop
,
licensing procedures to give industry a clearer investment picture.

The

Act also provides financial incentives through amendments to the 1936
Merchant Marine Act. 7 These incentives include the extension of
"vessel" status to OTEC plants, and the provision of up to $2 billion in
loan

g~arantee

authority for up to five OTEC demonstration plants.

The

law also calls for protection of the marine environment and consideration
of other ocean uses in the siting of OTEC plants.
Further progress toward commercialization was achieved in early 1981
with the successful deployment of the IMW OTEC-l engineering test

6

facility, also sited off Hawaii.

The facility was not designed to

generate power, but rather to test the performance of large scale
components of an DTEC plant.

DTEC-l has since been taken off station

because it has "already demonstrated all it was designed to do. 1I 8 The
next step in the Federal development is the awarding of contracts for
conceptual design of candidate design of candidate pilot plants.

Such

plants could be built and deployed by 1987. These recent developments
strongly suggest that DTEC could become a commercial reality within the
decade. This may yet occur despite the reduced level of funding if the
private sector can be encouraged to continue accelerated development.
Incentive such as Investment Tax credits, Energy Tax credits, and
Accelerated Depreciation provide a favorable environment for private
financial involvement in DTEC development.

B.

DTEC Systems and' Products
The conversion of ocean temperature differences into electricity

relies on the same thermodynamic principles as conventional thermal (oil,
coal and nuclear) power plants.

In such systems, a mechanical device (a

turbine connected to a generator) is placed between a heat source and a
heat sink, that is, no fuel is required for the heat sources.

The warm

water, in the case of DTEC, is the heat source and the cold water, the
heat sink.

Since the ocean thermal gradient, ~T, is extremely low

compared to that in conventional thermal plants, the maximum theoretical
efficiency is correspondingly low. The resulting net efficiency, 3-4%,
establishes a practical lower limit of around 2DoC average annual T for
the operation of DTEC facilities, although a 16.7 oC ~T in the coldest
month would be sufficient. 9 Geographically, this average ~T is

8

A) C LOS ED C Y C L E

B) OPEN CYCLE

Fi gure 3.

Sehenatie Diagrams of the Closed (a) and open (b)
eyel e OTEC systens
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available in a zone approximately 20° on either side of the Equator, see
Figure 2. 10 However, since no fuel is needed, net efficiency is not
the "bottom line," which is the energy cost in mills/kilowatt-hour of
electricity. This is a strong function of the plant capital investment
in dollars per kilowatt.
The actual conversion of ocean thermal energy into electricity can
take place in one of several cycles which have been devised over the
years. The two oldest of these, the closed cycle conceived by d 'Arsonva1,
and the open, or Claude cycle are considered the most technologically and
economically viable options at this time and are being given the most
research attention.

Other more recent designs are in a much earlier

stage of development and will probably not be demonstrated until the
simpler systems have been proven viable.
The closed cycle, Figure 3a, is distinguished from the open cycle
primarily by the use of a volatile working fluid such as ammonia. 11
The heat of the warm

~cean

water is conducted across the heat exchanger

and evaporates the liquid ammonia.

The resultant vapor passes through

and rotates the turbine/generator and is condensed by a second heat
exchanger through which the cold water is pumped.

The warm and cold

waters experience a mild, 1-2~C, change in temperature before being
discharged near the surface or at some depth below the warm water intake.
The condensed ammonia is then pumped back to the evaporator, hence the
name "closed cyc1e."
The open cycle, Figure 3b, uses evaporated seawater as the working
f1uid. 12 In this system the warm water is degasified and pumped a
partial vacuum through a flash evaporator, wherein a drop in pressure
causes a portion of the warm water to evaporate.

The resultant low

10
pressure steam drives the turbine and is condensed by the cold salt
water.

There are two options for open cycle condenser design, one of

which will result in the production of a fresh water byproduct.

For this

to happen, a heat exchanger, similar to that in the closed cycle, is
necessary to keep the "distilled" working fluid separate from the cold
water in the condensor.

If fresh water is not desired, the steam can be

condensed by direct contact with a je't or spray of cold seawater, thereby
eliminating the need for costly heat exchangers.

The open cycle's

advantages over the closed cycle, its fresh water byproduct and absence
of heat exchangers, tend to offset the fact that the turbines required
must be larger and operate at lower pressures than any existing vapor
turbines.

Those two benefits, in combination with the fact that there is

no risk of a toxic working fluid leak in the open cycle, have contributed
to continued early development of this option.
The attractiveness of OTEC as a large scale alternative power source
lies in the fact that, despite higher initial capital costs, the Ifue1"
is vast, renewable and free.

Calculations of potential OTEC power imply

that within 200 miles of the U.S. coast alone there is an annual capacity
equivalent to the total current U.S. energy consumption, or 70 quads
(quadrillion BTU's).13

In addition, the fact that the temperature of

the ocean surface mixed layer does not fluctuate significantly on a
diurnal scale means that OTEC is a base10ad option, that is, it can
supply utilities with bulk electricity 24 hours a day.

In order to plug

into a transmission grid, though, a sufficient thermal gradient must
exist within the economic limits of submarine cable technology, approximately 200 miles from shore. 14 Nonetheless, this limitation has
spawned some innovative concepts for the utilization of OTEC power,

\

/
l"

11

namely the "grazing" p1antship.
A grazing facility would not be attached to a cable and would thus be
free to migrate with the optimal ocean temperature regimes. The OTEC
power would be converted into, and transferred ashore as an energy
. intensive product.

Energy intensive products take two general forms:

those which can themselves be used as power sources, the so-called
"electric bridges,"15 a~d those products which require large amounts of
energy for their production on shore.

Candidate energy intensive

products currently under consideration for early at sea production
include ammonia and aluminum.
Ammonia production for industrial and agricultural applications now
uses natural gas as a feedstock; 630 billion cubic feet of natural gas,
3% of total U.S. gas produced, was consumed in 1978 for the production of
ammonia. 16 Avery notes that a high priority substitution of OTEC
ammonia for natural gas derived ammonia could result in an energy savings
equivalent to a half a million barrels of oil a day by 1999. Ammonia can
also be considered as an electric bridge, since it is a prime source of
hydrogen for use in fuel cells, which can in turn be used ashore for
base10ad electricity as well as for motive power.

Fuel cell technology

improvements are increasing the likelihood that the use of this energy
source will become widespread in the future.
The refining of alumina on board OTEC p1antships would also result in
substantial energy savings on land. (energy that would otherwise have been
consumed in the refining process.) The aluminum production rate in the
non-communist world was about 11 million ·tons per year in 1978 and is
expected to grow by 6-7% each year over the next decade, requiring 1000 2000 MW annual increase in capacity.17 A new, more efficient refining

12

process has been developed which is more compact and less sensitive to
platform motions than the conventional (Hall) process, making at-sea
production of aluminum a favorable option for early OTEC commercialization. 18
Besides these primary uses for baseload electricity or energy-intensive products, there are potential byproducts which broaden the appeal of
OTEC.

The cold water which is pumped up from depths up to 1000 meters is

rich in nutrients.

This artificial upwelling can be used as a primary

food source in an aquaculture or mariculture operation or can have the
effect of improving existing, ambient fish stocks.

Despite the worsening

status of world hunger, very few OTEC plants would be required to pump
the water to grow enough shellfish protein to saturate world markets,
assuming that aquaculture technology reaches that capability.19 Another
potential byproduct of OTEC is the fresh water, already mentioned, which
could be obtained from an open cycle p'lant. This combination of the
secondary benefits with the primary uses is helping to provide strong
incentive for continued accelerated development projects in the U.S. and
overseas.

C.

Environmental and Institutional Aspects
In addition to being a renewable and broadly applicable source of

energy, OTEC has the appealing characteristic of having a relatively low
environmental impact. Since
no commercial plants have yet been deployed,
. ,
this conclusion is based primarily on projections, although preliminary
experimental data support the predictions.

Currently, baseline oceano-

graphic data are being collected at potential OTEC sites for future
impact assessment.

Plant design and engineering concepts which can

13

mitigate possible environmental impacts are also continually peing
developed.
The major anticipated environmental impacts of OTEC are those
resulting from the physical presence of the platform (the "artificial
reef")t the

r~distribution

of nutrients in the water co1umn t the

entrainment of organisms t the release of biofou1ing control chemicals
into the seawater t and the release of protective hull coatings. 20 Of
these t the first two are considered to be beneficial impacts while the
latter represent potential negative impacts. Once initial demonstration
plants have been dep10yed t a more refined assessment of these negative
impacts will be possib1e t and in the meantime less toxic alternatives may
be developed.
There are also a number of other potential effects of OTEC dep10yment t
but these are not expected to have a significant impact on the environ. 21

mente

These include:

local climatic disturbances resulting from any

release of CO 2 dissolved in the cold water when it is brought to the
surface; the impingement of large ( ~ 4 cm) organisms on the intake'
screens; trace metals released from the corrosion of the heat exchanger
surfaces; crew and plant maintenance discharges; and the short term
effects of cable or pipe 1aying t and accidental working fluid leaks. As
noted ear1ier t the evaluation of these impacts is currently based
primarily on calculation as well as on experience gained in other
offshore activities t although continuing work in this area reenforces
this assessment. Once demonstration plants have been dep10yed t these
predictions can be tested and the results extrapolated to future
scenarios where commercial plants will be more densely distributed in
some areas.

14

In selecting potential OTEC sites, consideration must be given to the
effect of the environment on the plant as well as the effect of the plant
on the environment.22 Certain physical parameters will necessitate
special design considerations and may have the effect of limiting the
area open to OTEC deployment.
be considered are:

The primary physical variables which must

the structure of the temperature regime in the water;

the surface and subsurface current profiles; bathymetry and bottom
characteristics;

bi~10gica1

productivity; seawater chemistry; and extreme

meteorological events such as hurricanes.

These parameters are critical

to the establishment of construction, propulsion, mooring, pumping and
other design standards.
In addition to physical constraints, there are a number of domestic.
and international issues which need to be addressed in order to make
development decisions and to reduce the risk for potential investors. 23
Jurisdiction over OTEC activities, the environmental standards which must
be met, and the financial arrangements which are available must all be
identified on State, Federal, and international levels.

Environmental

and resource ownership questions must be examined, not only for specific
sites, but also for upstream and downstream effects of deployment.

A

unique aspect of the OTEC development program, in comparison to other new
industries, is that the institutional issues are being resolved in
anticipation of commercialization, not in response to it.

Through

participation in the writing of the legislation and regulations, industry
and government, as well as the academic and legal communities have
contributed to the formation of an institutional environment in which
legal, jurisdictional, and financial uncertainties have been eliminated
or minimized.

15

As a result of technological innovations in the DTEG development
program, in combination with the removal of institutional barriers, there
is an air of increasing confidence in DTEG among utility companies, the
ammonia and aluminum industries, and other potential DTEG users.

In

order for OTEC electricity to be competitive with other energy options
such as oil and coal for baseload electricity in Gulf Coast markets, the
first plants will most likely be sited near U.S. islands such as Hawaii
and Puerto Rico. 24 These islands are currently up to 98% dependent on
imported oil for their electricity production, and will provide
competitive markets for the initial, highest cost Plants. 25 The cost
of electricity from subsequent plants is reduced through a "1 earni ng
curve ll savings (the cost reductions resulting from the experience gained
by having built and operated the previous plants) which is estimated at
10% for each doubling of capacity (i.e., second, fourth, eighth, etc.

plants.)26 Thus, while the marginal cost of conventional power is
expected to increase in proportion to rising fuel costs, the cost of OTEC
electricity will decrease with each increase in capacity, as shown in
·
4 •27
F19ure

At this time OTEC appears to be a highly favorable future energy
option. Whether commercialization will be attained in ten or twenty
years remains to be seen, but continued development will not likely ever
be abandoned
at this .. point because the competitive energy cost compared
.
to depletable fuels is becoming increasingly attractive.. As each
remaining question becomes answered and each
DTEG gets ever closer.

barrie~

removed, commercial

One of the remaining questions is that of

jurisdiction in specific areas of the world where DTEC will potentially
be deployed. This thesis is an examination of one of those areas, the
Caribbean Sea, where early OTEC comrnericalization is envisioned.
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CHAPTER II
International Law of Coastal State Jurisdiction

A.

Historical

~ackground

on the Law of the Sea

Early in the OTEC development program, analysts recognized the need
to define and resolve the legal questions surrounding OTEC in order to
prevent any unnecessary delays in commercialization. 28 In the wake of
a UN resolution calling for a moratorium on deep seabed mining, observers
of international ocean affairs foresaw a potential barrier to OTEC
commercialization in the legal uncertainty which existed. OTEC, like
deep seabed mining, utilizes a resource which, because it had no prior
value, was not subject to any explicit jurisdictional regime.
Over the past century the perceived value of ocean resources has
increased substantially in response to the economic need for them and the
technological ability to exploit them.

Thus, while OTEC is relatively

new, the law of the sea relating to coastal state jurisdiction has been
in a state of transition for at least a century.

Consequently, OTEC has

had to be incorporated into an evolving legal regime while simultaneously
affecting its direction and momentum.
The recent history of the law of the sea has been characterized by a
variety of unilateral, bilateral and regional claims to maritime
jurisdiction. This dynamic trend has stabilized somewhat as a result of
the negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS.III) which have been taking place over the past decade. The
two most significant elements of this emerging law as it relates to OTEC
are the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the International
Seabed Authority (ISA). The former concept is part of the coastal state

18

jurisdictional regime which has evolved through both historical state
practice and the negotiations at UNCLOS III where it is one of the least
controversial subjects.

The latter, the ISA, on the other hand, is part

of a jurisdictional regime created solely out of bloc power politics at
UNCLOS III and remains a controversial issue today.
In the Caribbean, where no maritime space exists further than 200
miles from some land territory, the ultimate outcome of the ISA controversy will have little effect on the jurisdiction over the thermal
resource there.

The issue facing OTEC in the Caribbean, though, is the

delimitation of some 55-60 EEZ boundaries.

The issue of delimitation

between adjacent and opposite states has been a subject of dispute ever
since countries began to extend their jurisdiction seaward. Thus, while
a consensus may exist among countries on the EEZ concept, exploitation of
the resources of the zone may be constrained by a boundary dispute which
may persist for decades.

Before examining

~he

nature of boundary

delimitation disputes generally, and in the Caribbean specifically, a
discussion of the history of the emerging ocean jurisdiction regime is
necessary to support the assumption that this is the one which will apply
to OTEC, at least in early commercial stages.
The multiple zone concept presently under consideration at UNCLOS III
can be. traced to the 1930 Hague Conference on the Codification of
International Law held under the auspices of the League of Nations.

For

the two centuries preceeding that meeting, what many nations considered
to be a principle of international law (i.e., the three mile limit to a
territorial sea, beyond which was the high seas not under control of any
one state) had been subject to a number of exceptions wherever the
constraints of enforceability and exploitability permitted. At the end
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of the ,.9th century, one writer commented that the three mile 1imit was
universally accepted as a minimum breadth for the territorial sea, but
not so universal as a maximum as to give it the characteristic of a rule
of 1aw. 29 In the years preceeding the Hague Conference arguments for
and against the three mile limit filled many vo1umes. 30 In fact, worldwide opinions on the subject were so divergent that a separate committee
was formed at the Conference to deal specifically with the question of
maritime

j~risdiction.

The primary questions with which this Committee was concerned were
the breadth of the territorial sea and the powers of a littoral state in
adjacent and contiguous waters beyond national sovereignty.

The opinions

expressed there were so varied that no agreement was reached, and in fact
the discussion was elevated to the more basic issue of whether or not a
maximum limit concept was even applicable anymore.

One writer commenting

on the Conference noted:
the history of the last century has failed to invest
the three mile limit with any particular sanctity, and
recent conquests of distance make it seem in many
respects archaic. A merely spatial limit has many
disadvantages~ whatever number of miles be taken, and
recognition of the causal elements of the problem
seems to call for supplementing the spatial limit of
the territorial sea with some Rrovision for action
which may be taken outside it. 3l
Thus, while failing to produce an agreement on the breadth of the
territorial sea or a contiguous zone, the Hague Conference provided the
kindling for an issue which has yet to be finally resolved a half a
century later, namely the multiple zone concept with varying degrees of
coastal state control in each area.
At the time of the Hague Conference, and in earlier years, the
underlying reasons for the unilateral extension of jurisdiction were
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primarily to create a buffer zone on the seaward boundaries of a nation
in which its laws could be practically enforced and its neutrality or
military security could be maintained.

In many cases the protection of

historic domestic fisheries was also claimed as a justification for
extending limited jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea.

But in the

years following the Conference, new perceptions of the value of ocean
resources provided the stimulus for a wave of uni1atera1ism which exceeded
the limits of any of the divergent opinions of the pre-Conference years.
Thus, while past offshore resource uses were limited to coastal fisheries
including sedentary species such as sponges, oysters and coral, the
1940's witnessed the growth of the offshore oil industry and "high
technology" distant water fishing and
stronger

justificat~on

~ha1ing

operations which became a

for extending coastal state jurisdiction.

The landmark action of the mid 20th-century wave of uni1atera1ism is
generally considered to be the two Truman Proclamations of 1945. 32 The
U.S., which had firmly advocated a three mile limit for almost 150 years
preceeding and which was totally non-committal on a contiguous zone
concept at the Hague Conference fifteen years earlier, was nowestab1ishing a multiple zone regime. At the same time, in the absence of a multilateral agreement, this action established a precedent for subsequent
uncontrolled unilateral extension of coastal state jurisdiction by other
nations beyond all previously recognized limits.
the result of two factors:

The Proclamations were

a new perception of the value of ocean resour-

ces, and a belief that any attempt to reach a global or multilateral
agreement on the issue wouid be too slow, if not impossib1e. 33
The next unilateral claim, announced only a month after the Truman
Proclamations, was the Mexican Proclamation which simultaneously asserted
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jurisdiction over the shelf, to a depth of 200 meters, and the waters
above it. 34 The second unilateral claim, also citing the Truman
Proclamations as a precedent, came in the form of an Argentinian
Presidential decree in 1946, extending "sovereign power" over the
continental shelf and epicontinental sea while preserving the freedom of
navigation therein. 35 Then in June, 1947, a Chilean Proclamation
(citing the U.S., Mexican and Argentian claims) extended national
sovereignty over the continental shelf and the seas to a distance of 200
mi1es. 36
The Chilean c.l atm was unique in that it extended jurisdiction beyond
the limit of its (narrow) shelf to a fixed distance from shore.

The

expressed purpose of this action was to protect the domestic whaling
interests from foreign competition.

The limit of 200 miles was selected

(in error) on the basis of the alleged precedent created by the 1939
Declaration of Panama establishing a U.S. security buffer zone around the
Western HemisPhere. 37 Following within months of the Chilean claim was
the assertion by Peru of sovereignty over the continental shelf and
epicontinental sea, and the establishment of a 200 mile fisheries
protection zone which preserved the "right of free navigation of ships of
all nations according to international 1aw."38 By 1952, 14 of the 17
Latin American countries then existing had claimed diverse forms of
authority over their shelves and contiguous waters. 39 As a result,
three of these countries, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, convened in an attempt
to establish political legitimacy for their 200 mile zone concept.

The

Declaration of Santiago which emerged from'that meeting represented the
first multilateral agreement on a limit of an extended maritime zone, and
ultimately formed the basis for the 200 mile EEZ presently being
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considered at UNCLOS III.
Over the next decade, the 1950's, the global trend of unilateral
extensions of diverse forms of coastal state control continued. The
concurrent demise of colonialism added the ingredient of newly found
nationalism to the issue •. Opposition by maritime powers such as the U.S.
and Great Britain to many of the extended claims became more vociferous
during this "cold war" era as the need for strategic worldwide naval
capabilities increased.
of confusion.

The law of the sea was at this time in a state

However, an element of hope arose through work of the

International Law Commission (ILC) which had, since 1950, been addressing
the question of maritime jurisdiction. Responding to the ILC's initiative, the United Nations convened the Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea in February, 1958. 40
The Geneva Conference produced four Conventions on the Law of the
Sea: the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, the
Continental Shelf, and the Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas Conventions.4l These instruments
represented the first global codification of the law of the sea, and
among other things, crysta1ized the multiple zone concept as a principle
of that law.

They were not so comprehensive, however, that all the major

issues suddenly became resolved.
On the question of the breadth of the territorial sea, for example,
the negotiators were unable to reach accord.

They were able, neverthe-

less, to clearly define the rights and duties of the coastal state and of
foreign nations in that zone, namely the regime of innocent passage.

The

Convention on the Territorial Sea also affirmed the contiguous zone
concept for the enforcement of "customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
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regu1ations. 1I The maximum breadth of the contiguous zone was established
at 12 miles from the baseline, although this limit soon lost practicality
in the light of the growing number of 12 mile territorial sea claims.
The creation of a contiguous zQne, and most of the other provisions
adopted at Geneva, were attempts at establishing norms of behavior out of
an otherwise lawless international regime which existed at the time.

In

contrast, the Convention on the High Seas was introduced as a declaration
\

or codification of the existing law of the sea as determined by long
standing state practice •. In the High Seas area defined as a11 parts of
lI

the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters of a state, ••• no state may validly purport to subject any part
of them to its sovereigntY,1I and all states, including landlocked countries, have the right to exercise its freedoms. According to Article 2
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adjacent exclusive fishing zone (allowing access automatically only to
those foreign fleets which have historically fished in that specific
area) came within 7 votes of adoption.

The proposal was not accepted,

though, because a number of countries did not feel that the "6 + 6"
formula was sufficient to meet their needs. The failure of the 1958
Conference to establish a contiguous fishing zone, and to agree on a
specific breadth for the territorial sea, immediately created the need
for a second conference to deal specifically with those issues.
The 1960 Conference was also unable to produce an agreement on the
two questions before it.

As a result, the trend toward a broad (200

mile) fishing zone, which had been growing over the previous decade,
continued during the 1960's through unilateral and regional claims.

The

200 mile claims had become so prevalent by the time UNCLOS III was
convened that it has been one of the least controversial issues in those
negotiations.

Even the United States, which had long advocated a narrow

belt of coastal state jurisdiction over the water, adopted a 200 mile
Fisheries Conservation and Management limit in 1976. With or without a
treaty, this 200 mile concept has become a de facto element of international law as a result of the number of such claims which have been
made to dat~. 42
While the multiple zone concept failed in 1958 to become a reality
with respect to fisheries or other resource uses of the waters beyond the
territorial sea, it did become established with regards to the resources
of the Continental shelf beyond the limit of national sovereignty. The
Continental Shelf Convention conferred "sovereign rights" on the coastal
state to exploit the resources of the shelf, which it defined as "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast," including

25
the coasts of islands, "but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admit of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the said areas." This definition, while eventually proving inadequate,
paralleled that proposed by the ILC in 1956 and was adopted because it
accomodated advocates on both sides of the issue, namely those who
favored the depth criterion (though not necessari 1y 200 meters) "and those
who favored the exp10itabi1ity ru1e. 43 This definition had also been
previously adopted by a majority of Latin American countries at the
"I nter~Amertc'anSpec i ali zed Conference on Conservat ion of Natura 1
Resources: the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters" held at Ciudad
Trujillo, Dominican Republic, in 1956. 44 The inadequacy of this
definition of the continental shelf, which was realized even at the time
of the Conference,45 became more apparent before the middle of the
following decade as technological advances signalled the exp10itabi1ity
of deep seabed resources beyond (all conceivable definitions of) the
limit of the continental shelf.

Nevertheless, the Continental Shelf

Convention was adopted by an overwhelming majority (57 for, 3 opposed, 8
abstained) and represented significant progress in the global codification
of a law of the sea.
The decade of the 1960·s was another transitional period for maritime
law. Several trends occurred simultaneously which formed the framework
for the multiple zone regime that has emerged at UNCLOS III.
example, in 1960 territorial sea claims of

t~ree

For

miles comprised over

forty percent of the total territorial sea claims globally.

By 1972 this

number had dropped to 25%, whereas the percentage of 12 mile claims had
risen from 22% to nearly 50% in the same period. 46 This fact alone was
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seen as a mandate for another Law of the Sea Conference by the major
maritime powers who perceived the trend as a threat to their need for
free passage through strategic and commerically important straits.
The number of 200 mile claims also increased significantly during the
1960·s, primarily among the developing nations.

The Latin American

countries were the vanguard of this movement, and although the breadth of
the claims was uniformly 200 miles, the nature of the competences
asserted varied considerably.

Ecuador, Panama and Brazil, for example,

extended their territorial sea to 200 miles (recognizing only the right
of innocent passage), whereas Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Peru, and Uruguay explicitly (and Nicaragua implicitly) recognized the
freedom of navigation in the 200 mile zone. 47 This trend increased the
need for another global Law of the Sea Conference.
The 1960·s also witnessed technological developments which affirmed
the exploitability of deep seabed mineral resources.

At the same time,

offshore oil technology was enabling those countries which possessed it
to explore and exploit continental shelf resources in ever deeper waters.
Consequently, the inadequacy of the definition of the limit of the
continental shelf adopted in the 1958 Convention became increasingly
apparent, and a heated debate ensued as to the true legal and geographical limit of the shelf. 48 The issue was further compounded by the
suggestion of Ambassador Pardo of Malta before the UN General Assembly,
in 1967, that the resources of the seabed were the "common heritage of
mankind.

1I

In 1969 the UN adopted a resolution declaring a moratorium on

the exploitation of seabed resources beyond national jurisdiction until
such time as an international legal regime is established to govern the
activity. At the same time, they adopted a resolution calling for the
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convening of another law of the sea conference. 49
By the early 1970's seven jurisdictional zones had emerged in the law
of the sea, defined in some cases by treaty and in others by state
practice.

These zones are:

1) Internal and Archipelagic waters; 2) the

Territorial Sea; 3) the Contiguous Zone; 4) the Exclusive Fisheries or
Economic Zone; 5) the High Seas; 6) the Continental Shelf; and 7) the
Deep Seabed. While this regime evolved during the 1960's, in most cases
without the benefit of a global treaty to preserve order and uniformity,
certain norms were emerging which formed the basis for the treaty negotiations at UNCLOS III.
Also, by the early 1970's the developing countries had become aware
of the strength of their numbers.

Through regional negotiations and

agreements these countries were able to legitimize their views of international law in arenas where their own common interests did not have to
confront the interests of the developed countries.

In 1972, the Caribbean

countries adopted the Declaration of Santo Domingo, and although only 10
out of 15 participants in the Conference actually signed it, the.
declaration had a significant impact on the evolving law of the sea. 50·
Perhaps the most significant provision in the Declaration was the "patrimonial sea" concept, which extended sovereign rights over the living and
non-living resources beyond the territorial sea to a maximum limit of 200
miles while preserving the freedom of navigation and overflight therein.
Three weeks later, the African states concluded their regional seminar on
the law of the ,sea, held at Yaounde, Cameroon, with the recommendation
that the countries adopt the Exclusive Economic Zone concept for the
purpose of exploiting the resources of the
coasts. 51

water~

adjacent to their
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B.

Recent Developments at UNCLOS III
In 1974 the first meeting of UNCLOS III took place in Caracas.

By

this time the positions of a great number of the states on a variety of
issues had been publicized through unilateral and regional declarations,
and through the negotiations of the UN Seabed Committee which had been
meeting since 1970.

Commenting on the preparations for the Conference,

Oxman and Stevenson noted that already:
the issue does not appear to be whether broad coastal
state resource jurisdiction can emerge from the
Conference for this seems to be understood as a basic
condition of general agreement. The critical issue is
whether there can be agreement on sufficient treaty
safeguards for the interests of other states and the
international community in general to permit or, in
the view of some, to justify widespread agreement on
such broad jurisdiction.
As for the limits of this coastal state economic
jurisdiction, the distance of 200 nautical miles has
the broadest support, particularly among proponents of
an exclusive economic zone. 52
By the end of 1980 a Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal
Text) DC (IT), had emerged from the ninth session of UNCLOS 111. 53 The
size and complexity of the instrument is evidenced by the fact that it
contains 320 articles and eight annexes. The participants left the 1980
session with the optimistic feeling that by the end of the Tenth Session,
a plenary vote on the Convention would take place, as there were only a
few unresolved provisions remaining. These hopes faded somewhat when
President Reagan announced in March, 1981, that his administration would
have to undertake a complete review of the text before the U.S. could
take any further action; the results of this review are not yet public
information.

Nevertheless, the jurisdictional

re~ime

which divides the

ocean and ocean floor into seven zones appears to be one of the least
. 1 lssues.
.
54
controverSla
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The first zone is the Internal Waters, which are those waters on the
landward side of the baseline used to delimit the offshore zones, wherein
the coastal state exercises sovereignty just as though the waters were
part of the land territory (Article 8). This sovereignty also extends
from the baseline seaward to a maximum distance of 12 miles, the Territorial Sea, but is subject to the qualification that ships of all nations
enjoy the right of innocent passage'therein (Articles 2, 3 and 17).
Seaward of the Territorial Sea, to a distance af 24 miles from the
baseline, is the Contiguous Zone in which the coastal state may exercise
the control necessary to "prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or Territorial
Sea" (Article 33).

The Contiguous Zone actually extends into the

Exclusive Economic Zone which is defined as extending to a maximum of 200
nautical miles from the baseline used to measure the territorial sea
(Article 57). The EEZ is actually part of the fifth zone, the High Seas,
in which the coastal state has certain sovereign rights but in which
other states are entitled to the high seas freedoms not qualified by
Part V, the EEZ portion, of the Convention.
In other words, in the EEZ the
coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managin~ the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the sea-bed and subsoil and superjacent waters, and
with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
roduction of ener from the water currents and
w1 n s.
r 1c e
a, emp has1 s a e
The coastal state also enjoys jurisdiction over such activities as the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures,
. marine scientific research, and the 'protection and preservation of the
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marine environment (Article 56: 1b).

However, in the EEZ all states

enjoy the high seas freedoms defined in Article 87 as long as they are
not incompatible with Part V.

Thus, freedom of navigation exists in the

EEZ, whereas freedom of fishing does not.
In defining the high seas freedoms, the DC(IT) is somewhat more
explicit than the 1958 Convention, although it also uses the phrase inter
alia, thereby allowing all activities not explicitly excluded by the
Convention.

The only limitation on the high seas freedoms is that they

be exercised with IIdue consideration for the interests of other states in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due
consideration for the rights under this Convention with regard to
activities in the Area" (Article 87, part 2).

The Area is defined in

Article 1, part 1 as the II sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction," i.e., the Continental Shelf,
which comprise the sixth and seventh maritime zones in the emerging
regime.
The precise definition of the limit of the continental shelf was an
extremely difficult task for the negotiators, as made evident by the
proposed solution, which is schematically diagrammed in Figure 5.55
The coastal state has sovereign and exclusive rights to the resources of
the continental shelf, but where the shelf extends beyond 200 miles the
state must pay to the International Seabed Authority a percentage of the
value of the non-living resources which are exploited beyond the 200 mile
limit, unless the state is a developing country and is a net importer of
that particular mineral resource (Articles 77 and 82).

The International

Seabed Authority (ISA) was conceived in the UNCLOS lIt negotiations to
"organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to
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administering the resources of the Area" (Article 57).

Thus the mulitple

zone concept which has emerged is a complex system which reflects a
multitude of geographical, economic and political factors.
The question now is how does OTEC fit into this new regime? Since
OTEC facilities can be grazing, moored, or permanently mounted on the sea
floor, they can be considered vessels in some cases, however because they
will utilize a resource, the "freedom of navigation" in the EEZ will be
superceded by the coastal state's rights. Clearly, the coastal state
will have exclusive jurisdiction in the EEZ.

Beyond the 200 mile limit,

though, there is still some uncertainty.
Until recently the water of the oceans, as opposed to the subsoil,
have been used for essentially the same purposes for hundreds of years
(namely fishing and navigation).

In contrast, besides a few isolated

sedentary fisheries, the ocean floor and continental shelf were not
perceived as having any particular value until the mid 20th century.
Thus while the concept of high seas freedoms has had centuries to become
ingrained as a customary international principle, there was no such
established framework for the shelf and seabed. When the resources of
the waters became more valuable, and coastal states desired to expand
their control over them, there was an exi stinq legal regime which had to
be changed or compromised.

These were not new resources necessarily,

only preexisting ones becoming more valuable.

In the case of newly

perceived sea floor resources, on the other hand, the legal regime was
created in response to the activity in a virtual legal void.

There were

no counterbalancing historical principles to prevent the creation of a
jurisdictional regime such as the one which has evolved. Therein lies
the potential constraint to OTEC.
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C. OTEC and the Law of the Sea
OlEC is the only new widely applicable ocean (water) use to have
emerged over the past several hundred years. As the proven technology
becomes more visible, there will be an increased effort by states to
maximize their own potential OTEC resource.

For higher latitude

countries, with the technology but not an adjacent resource base, this
means affirming OTEC as a high seas freedom.

For lower latitude

countries adjacent to potential OTEC areas with the financial means to
obtain the technology, their efforts will be directed at maximizing the
seaward extent of their control.

These two forces will confront each

other at some point when OTEC is commercially available, although
considering'both the effort that was necessary to establish the 200 mile
limit, and its general acceptance by the global community, the
probability is low that any further extension would be tolerated. There
is a third potential force, though, which will propose that an
international authority be created to control exploitation of the OTEC
resource beyond the limit of national jurisdiction in the same way that
the seabed regime has evolved. The proponents of this idea, those
countries without the means to finance their own OTEC operation, will
argue that OTEC is not a historical high seas freedom, and that the
thermal resource beyond 200 miles belongs to all peoples and must,
therefore, be exploited jointly by all nations under an international
authority.
If international negotiations on an OTEC convention are begun in
anticipation of OTEC commercialization, a confrontation over this issue
is probably unavoidable. Without an international agreement, the jurisdictional framework will be determined by the practice of states and the

34

response of other states, that is through customary international law.
The more time that passes between initial unilateral actions and any
global negotiations, the stronger the argument will be to simply codify
the state practice into an international convention rather than create a
new legal regime.
The United States, the world's leader in DTEC technology development,
has taken this latter approach. Rather than push for early international
negotiations on an DTEC Treaty, the U.S. has passed its own DTEC Act
which is the first step in affirming DTEC as a customary high seas use
five to ten years before anticipated commercialization.
Among the purposes of the DTEC Act of 198D, described in its
Declaration of Policy, is to provide for the "consideration of the
interests of other ocean users,"56 that is "due consideration. II
Subsection 6 of the Declaration of Policy states that "nothing in the Act
shall be construed to affect the legal status of the high seas, the
superjacent airspace, or the seabed and subsoil, including the
Continental Shelf." And in the analysis section of the committee report
on HR6154, this point is restated:
This bill is consistent with the Convention on the
High Seas and the general principles of current
international law, which allow a country to license
its citizens to conduct activities on the High Seas,
so long as it requires them to conduct their
activities with reasonable regard to the rights of
other countries and their citizens to exercise the
freedom of the High Seas. 57
The international law (both

customar~

and in the DC(IT)) applicable

to OTEC at the present, therefore, gives the coastal state exclusive
control out to 200 miles.

Beyond that limit the issue is somewhat

unresolved although initial steps have been taken to establish-OTEC as a
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high seas freedom.

In an area such as the Caribbean, where all the

maritime space is within 200 miles of some continental or insular
territory, the issue of control over OrEC would appear to be resolved.
This is especially true considering the general consensus in the region
on the EEZ concept.

However, in attempting to apply the idea of extended

jurisdiction to real maritime areas, a completely new set of issues
arises.
The delimitation of maritime boundaries between neighboring countries
has often been accomplished with a minimum of conflict through bilateral
treaty negotiations.

In many cases the boundaries have not even been

delimited because the lack of an exploitable resource minimizes the
necessity of a boundary.

However, when the boundary in question involves

the allocation of a valuable resource, the issue may require third party
settlement or the dispute may persist for decades, preventing either side
from enjoying full benefit of the resource.

Such a dispute may simply

center on the delimitation principles to be applied, but in many cases it
raises the"more basic question of sovereignty over a particular land or
island territory, which in turn affects the maritime boundary in question.
In an area such as the Caribbean, where most of the countries depend
on imported fuels, the potential of a vast, free and renewable energy
resource is itself a strong justification for countries to strongly assert
their claims to maritime areas.

If two sides involved in a boundary

negotiation disagree on the principles to be applied in the delimitation,
a final solution will be more difficult to reach.

Considering the status

of the law regarding maritime boundary delimitation, such a situation is
highly likely and will have negative consequences for the exploitation of
OTEC in the area in dispute.

The following chapter will examine the
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development and status of the international customary and positive law of
maritime boundary delimitation.
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CHAPTER III
Maritime Boundary Delimitation Principles

A.

Historical State Practice and Positive Law
The issue of maritime boundary delimitation is relatively new

compared to that of the nature and extent of coastal state jurisdiction
discussed in the previous section. Over the past 50 years, the
significance and complexity of the subject have both increased as a
result of the greater number and diversity of possible boundaries arising
from the seaward expansion of coastal state control.

Despite the fact

that at the 1930, 1958 and UNCLOS III meetings, nations have negotiated
alternative rules and principles which might be applied, and despite the
fact that the World Court has decided in several maritime boundary cases,
there is still considerable room for interpretation of the law, which in
fact remains as one of the final controversial issues in the Draft
Convention. 58 The consequence of this is that maritime boundary
disputes may persist for decades and result in delays in the exploitation
of the resources of the particular disputed area.

This is especially

true in an area such as the Caribbean, where the outcome of one particular
bilateral agreement could affect the boundary of a third country which
was not party to the negotiations.

The following general discussion of

the law of maritime boundary delimitation will serve as a background to
the discussion of the boundary situation in the Caribbean.
The first international attempt at drafting a systematic body of
rules for the delimitation of maritime boundaries occurred at the 1930
Hague Conference.59 At that meeting, negotations centered on the
method to be applied in the delimitation of the seaward and lateral
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limits of a nation's Territorial Sea (whether three miles or some other
breadth).

The importance of establishing some method was realized at

that time, although no final solution was agreed upon.
At the Hague Conference three alternative methods were proposed:
a) a line parallel to and following the sinuosities of the coastline;
b) a series of straight lines parallel to straight lines drawn from point
to point, or island to island; and c) (the American proposal) a line, all
points of which are three miles (or any other distance) from the nearest
point on the coast. The U.S. delegation argued that this latter option
was advantageous because a person navigating offshore could easily
determine if the vessel's position was within the territorial sea.
During the negotiations, though, the fact became apparent that, because of
the nearly infinite variety of coastlines with special situations such as
bays, islands, straits, roadsteads, etc., a simple set of rules would not
be acceptable to all parties.

Two alternative positions were identified:

either different rules could be devised for particular types of coasts,
or a single rule could be adopted with provisions for occasional
impracticable results which occur with concave or complicated coast1ines. 60 Due to the diversity of opinions there on this, and other
questions, no final provisions were adopted by the Hague Conference.
During the next twenty years, relatively little was written on the
technical and theoretical aspects of the delimitation of seaward areas
under national jurisdiction. 61 The Truman Proclamation of 1945 stated
that:
In cases where the continental shelf extends to the
shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent
State, the boundary shall be determined by the United
States and the State concerned in accord~nce with
equitable principles. (emphasis added)e .
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However, the significance of this provision did not become apparent for
nearly twenty years when the ICJ repeated the emphasised phrase in the
North Sea Cases decision to be discussed later.
By the early 1950·s, as the legal regime of the oceans began to
evolve into the multiple zone concept, the importance of maritime
boundary delimitation resurfaced.

In 1951, S. Whittemore Boggs wrote:

If it be recognized that developing technologies may
bring into grasp in the relatively near future some of
the great resources of the sea and of the seabed and
its subsoil at very considerable distances from shore
in at least a few areas, and that states or private
initiative will require assurance in advance that
their interests will be generally admitted, some
principle should be formulated for the delim~~ation of
the contiguous zone between adjacent states.
He then proceeded to detail a technique which could be used as a model
for the establishment of an internationally accepted delimitation
procedure.

The method suggested by Boggs was significant in that it was

the first proposed body of rules which provided for the delimitation of
contiguous, special purpose zones beyond the limit of sovereignty.
However, the great variety of coastlines, island situations, and other
unique circumstances around the world, precluded the acceptability of
such an arbitrary, singular procedure.
In fact, in December of the same year, 1951, the ICJ ruled in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, affirming that in certain exceptional
instances, the method used to establish a baseline, hence delimit the
territorial sea, can depart from the generally accepted rules. 64 The
court upheld the validity of a series of straight baselines first claimed
in a 1955 Royal Norwegian Decree. The 47 baselines varied in length up
to 44 miles, and connected the outermost points of the mainland and the
numerous rocks and islets forming the "Skjaergaard." The court noted
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that while the "arcs of circles" method might be applied to an ordinary
coast, the special geographical situation along the Norwegian coastline
called for the application of a different system; it also found that
there was no universally accepted rule limiting the length of those
baselines.

The Court did not attempt to legislate a universal rule for

the delimitation of the territorial sea, but it did affirm the idea that
various methods may be applied in such a delimitation as long as the
resultant belt of territorial waters would not deviate appreciably from
the general direction of the coastline.

Thus, while the British argued

from the position that delimitation should follow a single rule, with
exceptions made only in particular circumstances and following other
specific rules, the court determined that there was no single rule in
international law and took the more flexible position that different
methods may be applied by the coastal state, taking into consideration
various elements such as the geographical character of the area, the
economic interests there, and the historical nature of the claim.

This

decision, while ending 40 years of dispute in the case before the Court,
has had significance for the subsequent evolution of the law of maritime
boundary delimitation.
At about the same time as the ICJ ruled in the Fisheries case, the
ILC began its work on the questions of the regime of the territorial seas
and the regime of the high seas.

Between 1952 and 1954 a committee of

experts drafted a set of technical rules to be applied in the
delimitation of the territorial sea, dealing particularly with baselines
enclosing bays, islands and other coastal irregularities. 65 These
provisional articles were then distributed to various governments for
comment. The comments were subsequently incorporated into a final
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report, drafted in 1956, and formed a negotiating text for the 1958
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, where most of the recommendations were adopted in the Conventions.
Although the Conference fai1e? to reach an accord on the breadth of
the territorial sea, or the contiguous fisheries zone concept, it did
produce a set of rules to be applied in the delimitation of certain
maritime boundaries (namely the baseline, Territorial Sea, Contiguous
Zone, and Continental She1f).66 The rules adopted at Geneva outlined
specific principles and techniques to be applied under normal
circumstances and under certa1n special circumstances.

However, soon

after they were adopted, a number of shortcomings in the delimitation
provisions of the Conventions became apparent, both in particular
attempts at their application by states, and in the writings of
geographers, lawyers and other scholars of marine affairs.

One of the

more prominent issues has been the definition of llspecia1 circumstances;ll
in other words, the Conventions did not precisely describe the criteria
to be used in evaluating whether a particular circumstance is llspecia1,1l

.

thereby qualifying it for a different set of delimitation rules •
In the case of the baseline, for example, the normal line is the low
water line which appears on the charts of the coastal state (Article 3,
Territorial Sea Convention). Straight baselines are permissible in
1110ca1ities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along its coast in its irrunediate vicinityll
(Artic1e 4, par. 1, emphasis added). The lines must not depart appreciably from the II gener a1 direction of the coast1ine ll and must enclose sea
areas which are "sufficiently linked to the land domain to be subjett to
the regime of internal waters II (Article 4, par. 2).

No length limit was
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adopted for the straight baselines.

If the somewhat imprecise geographi-

cal conditions in paragraph 1 are met, then "account may be taken •.• of
economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and
importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage" (Article 4,
par. 4).

Negotiators at the Conference, recognizing that there are count-

less unique situations around the world, were unable to devise a clear and
absolute set of rules.

The imprecise language used in the Conventions

has created a variety of interpretation problems, as Professor Alexander
once rhetorically queried:
How, for example, can one determine the cut off point
at which islands along a coast do not constitute a
"fringe," or when economic interests peculiar to a
coastal region do not justify liberal baseline
de1imi tat ion? 67
Another set

~f

interpretation problems existed in the method outlined

for delimiting the baseline across the mouths of bays. Article 7 of the
Territorial Sea Convention distinguishes two classes of bays, juridical
and historic, which, if they are wholly within the coast of one state,
may be enclosed by straight baselines.

The method provided by the

Convention for evaluating whether a particular coastal indentation is a
juridical bay is one of the most precise geographical formulas to have
been adopted at the 1958 Conference. Yet in 1962, Aaron Shalowitz of the
U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, devoted eight pages of his comprehensive
work on maritime boundaries to identifying some of the ambiguities and
problems in the Convention's definition of a bay and the method for
enclosing it with a straight baseline. 68
In Territorial Sea Convention, even if a bay does not qualify under
the criteria for a juridical bay, it may still be enclosed by a straight
baseline if it is considered a "so-called 'historic' bay" (Article 7,
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par. 6).

However, the Conference failed to define what a historic bay

is, and thus created the potential for a boundary delimitation conflict
from a disputed historic bay claim.

Dr. Alexander also identified a

second problem with historic bays, namely in the case of a former colony
whose mother country did not perceive. a particular bay in the same way as
the native inhabitants do upon their independence.

He asks:

"After how

many years of independence may such a former colony be in a position
legitimately to advance its claim to certain offshore waters as belonging
to it historically."69
The Territorial Sea Convention also did not adequately resolve the
question of islands and their effect on the delimitation of the
territorial sea boundary. Geographically, islands have a multitude of
characteristics:

shape, size, texture, adjacency, habitability, economic

importance, and political status, to name a few. However, Article 10 of
the Convention defined an island simply as a "naturally formed area,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide." According to
the second paragraph "the territorial sea of an island is measured in
accordance with the provisions of these articles." Robert Hodgson noted
in 1973:
the single most troublesome natural feature to cloud
the maritime limits field has proven to be islands islands as basepoints, islands as maritime boundaries,
islands as atoll, islands as archipelagos, islands as
islands. The issues are troublesome and pervasive. 70
The treatment of. islands and their effect on boundaries in the Geneva
Conventions (Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and Continental Shelf)
created a number of technical interpretation problems in sUbsequent
years.

The greatest difficulty associated with islands had been their

role as "special circumstances" in the delimitation of continental shelf
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boundaries.

In addition, as more countries claimed extended economic

zones, offshore islands (beyond the territorial sea and not rising out of
the continental shelf of the mainland) became more significant because of
their potential role as basepoints for claims to extensive maritime
area.

Hodgson points out:
Islands, except in a few specific instances, do not
greatly distort territorial sea boundaries, due to the
narrow limits involved. They may, however, produce
tortuous boundaries, difficult to administer unless
modified through a process of simplification or the
choice of an alternative method of boundary
delimitation. Inequities become prevalent with
increasing distance from the national baselines. 7l

As this discussion will show, the numerous special circumstances created
by the variety of island-mainland relationships have been, and will
continue to be the subjects of dispute in delimitation negotiations.
,,--I

Both the Territorial Sea Convention and the Continental Shelf
Convention allow for an exception to be made to the delimitation rule in
cases where there are "special circumstances." The rule for the
territorial sea is that, "failing agreement," no state may extend its
boundary beyond the median line which is equidistant from the baselines
of the two countries.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply,
however, where it is necessary by reason of historic
title or other special circumstances to delimit the
territorial seas of two states in a way which is at
variance with this provision. (Article 12, par: 1,
emphasis added)
Likewise the Continental Shelf Convention states that the shelf boundary
between adjacent states, or opposite states, shall b'e IIdetermined by
agreement between them.

In the absence of agreement, and unless another

boundary is justified by special circumstances,1I the boundary is a line
which is equidistant from the baselines of both states .(Article 6, empha-
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sis added).

The use of the term "special circumstances" without any

further elaboration has resulted in prolonged boundary negotiations, some
of which are yet unresolved, others of which resorted to third party
settlement.
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, for example, which ended in
1969, were the first ICJ decisions on a maritime boundary subsequent to
the 1958 Geneva Conference. 72 The task before the Court was,
basically, to determine the principles and rules to be applied in the
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between Germany and
Denmark, and Germany and the Netherlands.

The parties had, in 1964 and

1965, agreed upon partial boundaries which were based on the equidistance
method.

At the time, Denmark and the Netherlands were parties to the

Continental Shelf Convention, whereas Germany had signed but not ratified
it.

Germany contended that Article 6 of the Convention had not become

customary law and under the circumstances was inapplicable because the
equidistance method could not be used where it produced an inequitable
apportionment of the shelf.

Germany argued that a prolongation of the

partial (equidistance) boundaries would produce an inequitable result due
to the concavity of the coastline in the area, therefore even if Article 6
did govern the case, this was a case of "special circumstances." Denmark
and the Netherlands contended that Article 6 did govern the case and that
the equidistance method applied when parties were unable to reach
agreement. They also felt that the shape of the coastline was not a
"special circumstance."
The court held that the Continental Shelf Convention was not
:.............

declaratory of a rule of customary international law enjoining the use of
th equidistance method, "nor has its subsequent effect been constitutive

46
of such a rUle."73 As a consequence, the question of whether or not a
"special circumstance" existed became irrelevant because
once the use of the equidistance method of delimitation
is determined not to be obligatory in any event, it
ceases to be legally necessary to prove the existence
of special circumstances in order to justify not using
that method. 74
The task which the Court saw before itself was to "indicate the rules of
law in the light of which the methods for effecting the delimitation will
have to be chosen."75 Base~ upon the historical development of the
legal regime of the continental shelf, the Court found that the
underlying principle was that the "delimitation must be the object of
agreement between the states concerned, and that such agreement be
arrived at in accordance with equitable principles"76(emphasis added).
The next question before the Court, therefore, was to define the rule
of equity.
Equity does not necessarily imply equality••• in the
present case there are three states whose North Sea
coastlines are in fact comparable in length and which
have been given broadly equal treatment by nature except that the configuration of one of the coastlines
would, if the equidistance method is used, deny to one
of the States treatment equal or comparable to that
~iven the other two. Here, indeed, is a case where,
1n a theoretical situation of equality within the same
order, an inequality is created.... It is therefore
not a question of totally refashioning geography whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical situation of quasi~equality as between a number of
states, of abating the effects of an incidental special
feature from which an unjustifiable difference of
treatment could result. 7?
By a vote of eleven to six the Court decided that
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in
accordance with equitable principles, and taking
account of all relevant circumstances, in such a way
as to leave as much as possible to each Party all
those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a
natural prolongation of its land territory into and
under the sea, without €ncroachment on the ~%tural
prolongation of the territory of the other;
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The factors which are to be considered in negotiating a boundary are
l} the general configuration of the coasts of the
Parties, as well as the presence of any special or
unusual features; 2) so far as known or readily
ascernable, the physical and geological structure, and
natural resources, of the continental shelf areas
involved; and 3) the element of a reasonable degree of
proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in
accordance with equitable principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf
areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length
of its coast measured in the general direction of the
coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the
effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf.del}~itations between adjacent States in the
same regl0n.
As a result of this

deci~ion,

the boundaries finally agreed upon by

the parties were not extensions of the equidistance boundaries already
delimited, but some other lines beginning at the terminus of the partial
boundaries, and extending Germany's jurisdiction over a portion of the
North Sea continental shelf out to the median line between the
and the United Kingdom.

continen~

The decision of the Court, while only concerned

with the principles of continental shelf boundary delimitation, has also
had an effect on the development of the law of extended economic zone
boundaries.

The issue which has since emerged both at the UNCLOS III

meetings and in individual boundary negotiations is one of drafting and
applying a delimitation rule in which there is a satisfactory balance
between "equitable principles" and "equidistance."
A brief examination of selected state practice will show how a
variety of creative methods have been used to resolve the conflict of
equidistance versus equitable principles. The Franco-Spanish boundary in
the Bay of Biscay, for example, reflects the geographical characteristics
of the respective coastlines by dividing the shelf with a "reasonable
degree of proportionality.n 80 From the land boundary terminus the
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French coastline runs northward and then northwestward while the Spanish
coast is roughly on an east-west parallel.

The boundary line which

extends seaward from the land terminus to a point 68.4 miles from the
baselines is the equidistance line. At that point an arc was drawn from
the hinge point on the French coastline (where it begins to head northwestward) to the Spanish baseline.

Spain wanted to extend the equidis-

tance line to the intersection with the arc, ·whereas France desired to
terminate it at the intersection with a straight line connecting the
points of the arc on the respective baselines.

The parties agreed to

"split" the difference, and from that point to the seaward terminus of
the boundary the line was drawn to reflect proportionality between the
shelf allocation and the length of the "unused" segments of the baselines
(beyond the intersection of the arc with the baselines). As Hodgson
noted:

"this delimitation clearly reflected both the relationship to the

landward margin and to the edict of the ICJ in the North Sea Cases
decision."81
The Tunisia-Italy boundary agreement also shows an innovative
approach to delimitation where "special circumstances" exist due to the
presence of four small islands under Italian sovereignty on the Tunisian
side of the strait between Sicily and Tunisia. 82 In this case a strict
median line between the closest Italian and Tunisian shores would create
an inequity in the apportionment of the common shelf. To remedy this, an
equidistance line was calculated, disregarding the four small islands.
Then a maritime zone was drawn around each island (12 mile territorial
sea, one additional mile continental shelf) the boundaries of which
intersected the equidistance line, thereby maintaining a continuous
connection (a corridor) with the Italian shelf. This case is an example
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of how two states can, by agreement, delimit the shelf boundary between
them when there is a "special circumstance" created by several small
islands between the mainlands. Not all such situations are resolved so
easily; the case of the Anglo-French continental shelf boundary dispute
is one in which the presence of several islands created divergent
interpretations of where the boundary should lie and necessitated a third
party settlement.
The U.K.-France dispute involved two separate segments of the
boundary where the existence of islands would have resulted in an
inequitable apportionment of the shelf had they been given full effect in
the delimitation process. 83 One part of the dispute concerned the
British Channel Islands which are in Granville Bay just a few miles off
the French mainland. The other part of the dispute arose from the fact
that the Sci11y Islands extended further into the North Atlantic,
southwesterly from the English coast than did the French island of Ushant
off the peninsula of Brest.

In both cases, strict application of the

equidistance method would have produced favorable results for the
British. After four years of unsuccessful negotiations the governments
entered into an Arbitration Agreement in 1975 wherein they agreed to
accept a binding decision from the Court, and asked that the Court not
simply declare the rules and principles to be applied but actually decide
the course of the boundary and draw it on a chart.
Regarding the Channel Islands segment, the U.K. argued that an
equidistance line should be drawn between the French coast and the
islands. The French contended that the islands should only be entitled
to a narrow belt of maritime jurisdiction which would create, in effect,
an enclave on the French continental shelf; that shelf, they claimed,
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extended to a line equidistant from both mainlands. Regarding the
boundary in the western portion of the channel, the British again argued
for strict application of the equidistance method, using both the Scilly
Islands and Ushant as basepoints. The French position was that the
boundary line should be

a bisector

of the angle formed by two lines

following the general directions of the respective mainlands. Before the
Court was able to resolve the disputes, it had to determine what laws
were applicable and then how the laws could be interpreted in .the case at
hand.
The French argued that the Geneva Convention did not apply because of
the reservations made at the time of French accession to it,
the formal U.K. objections to them.

valida~ed

by

In the absence of a treaty, the

applicable law ought to be customary law stated in the North Sea Cases
and the boundary must therefore be drawn in accordance with equitable
principles and with consideration for the natural prolongation of French
territory.

However, even if the Court were to find the 1958 Convention

applicable, the presence of "special circumstances" precluded the strict
application of the equidistance method.
The British contended that the Geneva Convention did apply and that
France had failed to prove that the circumstances were "special
circumstances." Therefore, the boundary should be determined, in the
absence of agreement, by the equidistance formula. Alternatively, if the
Court found that the applicable law was customary law
then the boundary line should be drawn in such a way
as to leave as much as possible to each party of its
natural prolongation without encroachment on the
natural prolongation of the other party. Since the
continental shelf was essentially of a continuous
geologic character, the U.K. argued that the natural
prolongation of the tWQ countries should be divided by
the equidistance 1ine. 84
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In determining the applicable law, the Court found that the Continental Shelf Convention did apply except to the extent of the French reservation to Article 6. 85 In those cases the principles of customary international law were found to apply.

The Court noted, however, this would

produce the same result in the circumstances of the present case as would
the application of Article 6.

Under either legal regime the ultimate

objective is a boundary delimited in accordance with equitable principles.
In the Channel Islands area the Court held that customary law
applied. The question was, therefore, whether the islands should be
given full effect in the application of the natural prolongation
principle, or whether, on equitable grounds, some modification should be
made in the application of the rule.

Taking into account all relevant

geographical, economic and political factors, the Court modified the
natural prolongation principle by first drawing an equidistance line
between the two, otherwise lequa1" coastlines, and drawing a second
boundary 12 miles from the baselines of the Channel Islands on their
. north and west aspects.

The boundary between the islands and the French

mainland was left undetermined.

The result was that a British enclave

was created on an otherwise continuous French continental shelf extending
from shore to the equidistance line between the mainland.
In the western part of the English Channel, the Court found that
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention applied but that the Sci11y
Islands constituted a "specia1 circumstance." Consequently, the Court
applied neither the British proposal for a strict equidistance line nor
the French "bisector" concept.

The final line drawn by the Court was

based on the relative distances of the Sci11ies and Ushant from the
respective coastlines (the former approximately twice the latter). This
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line gave "half effect" to the Sci11y Islands by splitting in half the
area bounded by two equidistant lines, one of which gave full effect to
the islands and the other of which disregarded them.
In commenting on the Court'decision, David Colson notes three
significant points. 85 The first is that
the international law respecting maritime boundary
delimitation rests on a continuum of law, which, while
~dopted from various sources, rests upon an equitable
foundation •••• Secondly, the Courtls insistence on
taking into account all geographical and other
circumstances assures that all the relevant factors
will be taken into account in any particular situation.
And third, since the Court had noted that the application of the
principles being discussed at UNCLOS III would have produced the same
results, Colson commented
that the principles relating to continental shelf
delimitation arising out of this case, the Geneva
Convention of 1958, the North Sea Cases and state
practice are similar and relevant to the principles
relating to the delimitation of 200 mile fishing and
economic zones and continental margins.
The underlying principle through all of these sources of law is that the
boundary should produce an equitable result considering all the relevant
circumstances.

C.

UNCLOS III Developments and Current Status
The fact that the law has evolved progressively over the past thirty

years through a variety of specific activities (bilateral agreements,
third party settlements, and global treaties) would seem to imply that
there currently exists less confusion over the method and principles to
be applied in maritime boundary delimitation.

However, an examination of

the development of the proposed EEZ and Continental Shelf delimitation
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provisions in the DC (IT) will show that even at this final phase of
UNCLOS III there is still a division among the negotiators as to the
relative weight to be placed on each element of the law. The primary
difference centers on whether "equitable principles" or the
"equidistance/specia1 circumstances" concept should be given precedence
in the text of a Law of the Sea Treaty.
The first UNCLOS III negotiating text (Informal Single Negotiating
Text - SNT) which was

prepar~d

at the Second Session in Geneva in 1975

contained the following provision regarding EEZ delimitation between
neighboring countries (identical to the provisions for continental shelf
delimitation in Article 70):
1) The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected
by agreement in accordance with equitable principles,
employing, where appropriate, the median or equidistance line, and taking account of all relevant circumstances ••• 3) Pending agreement, no State is entitled
to extend its exclusive economic zone beyond the
medign line or the 'equidistance line. (Article 61,
SNT)87
Regarding islands, no specific reference was made in the delimitation
articles of the SNT except that Article 132 provides that:

"Rocks which

cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have
no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." This provision has
been retained in all subsequent versions of the text.

However, the use

of criteria such as "economic life" and "human habitation" becomes
questionable when one considers the hypothetical, but not inconceivable
scenario in which an OTEC facility is constructed on such a "rock."

Does

the rock become a natural island for the purpose of boundary delimitation, or is it an artificial island which has no effect on the boundary?
A second problem with the delimitation provisions stems from the fact
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that Continental Shelf articles and EEl articles have been negotiated
essentially as one. 88 The EEl is an artificial concept which, unlike
the Continental Shelf, bears no relation to natural features.

Secondly,

the law of Continental Shelf delimitation has evolved through positive
law (Geneva Conventions), international judicial action (North Sea and
Anglo-French cases), and state practice over at least thirty years.

The

law of EEl delimitation, on the other hand, has emerged solely from
negotiations at UNCLOS III and a few bilateral agreements. The situation
may arise where an EEl boundary based on equidistance would not coincide
.with a Continental Shelf boundary

bas~d

on concepts such as "natural

prolongation." The U.S.-Canada boundary dispute in the .Gulf of Maine,
for example, involves such an issue over Georges Bank. 89 The problem
.

becomes progressively more complicated if there is an island on the
shelf, if the island is separated by a channel in the shelf between it
and the mainland, or if the island rises from its own insular shelf.
Would two boundaries be necessary, one for the shelf and one for the

EEl? Or will countries be willing to relinquish part of one or the other
zones to which it might be entitled under separate principles of law?
The answer can only lie in what states agree to do in particular cases,
but clearly the possibility exists for these disputes to be prolonged on
this issue.
In the Spring of 1976, a Revised Single Negotiating Test (RSNT)
emerged from the New York Session of UNCLOS III. On the subject of
boundary delimitation, the only change was in reference to provisional
arrangements in the abs~nce of agreement. 90 Instead of applying the
median or equidistant line, the new rule called for states to reach a
provisional agreement "taking into account the provisions of paragraph 1."
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While the point of making the change was to avoid any unintentional
effect which a reference to the provisional equidistance line might have
on a final agreement,91 the new version failed to provide a
satisfactory solution to the problem.
In 1977, the Sixth Session of UNCLOS III was held in New York.

A

second revised negotiating text (the Informal Composite Negotiating Text ICNT) was issued following the meetings.

The delimitation provisions,

paragraph 1, and the interim measures, paragraph 3, remained identical to
those in the RSNT.

However, at the Seventh Session held in Geneva and

New York in the Spring and Fall, respectively, of 1978, the "delimitation
of maritime boundaries was identified as one of the core issues which had
priority over other issues at the Conference. "92
At the Seventh Session negotiations, dissatisfaction with the ICNT
provisions became more apparent. The discussions became clearly
bipartisan, with one side favoring the median or equidistance standard,
while the other favored delimitation relying primarily on equitable
principles. 93 Numerous informal proposals and counter proposals were
made in an attempt to reach a compromise.

The Chairman of the

negotiating committee eventually put forth two suggestions, both of which
failed to reconcile the differences of the two sides.
The Chairman then established a smaller negotiating group to identify
the basic elements of the delimitation standard which could be used in
preparing a draft article.

By the end of the Geneva Session, the

negotiating group had not reached any agreement except the rejection of
the Chairman's second proposal.

The negotiating group picked up again at

the resumed Seventh Session in the Fall of 1978 in New York. This time
the group focused more on the settlement of disputes and interim measures
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provisions, but they were able to identify four elements which
a final delimitation provision should contain. These are
summarized in the Chairman's Report:
1) reference to the effect that any measure of
delimitation should be effected by agreement; 2) a
reference to the effect that all relevant or special
circumstances are to be taken into account in the
process of delimitation; 3) in some form, a reference
to equity or equitable principles; 4) in some f
a
reference to the median or equidistance line. 940rm,
At the opening of the Eighth Session in Geneva in 1979, the Chairman
reviewed the four elements and restated the two positions on the controversy.

He then proposed that a "neutral formula," as opposed to a compro-

mise, be constructed which avoids a hierarchical classification of the
elements.

-

Again a number of draft articles were proposed as neutral

provisions, all of which failed to bring the Committee to an accord.

"

These provisions basically amounted to a reshuffling of the same words
and phrases with the addition of terms such as "concurrently" and "a
solution satisfactory to both parties." But as A.O.Adede commented:
The apparent tendency to shift words and expressions
around reflected in all these new proposals should not
be dtsmissed as a useless exercise. There were
genuine attempts at avoiding the establishment of a
hierarchy of the elements in order to formulate a
neutral text. u9 5
Nevertheless, at the end of the Eighth Session, the delimitation
provision of the revised lCNT (RlCNT) was still identical to that adopted
after the Second Session.
The Ninth Session met in New York and Geneva in 1980. The Chairman
of the Negotiating Group introduced a new proposal of his own which was
described as "one which did not reflect any final compromise ••• but
indicated the Chairman's assessment of an alternative which might in time
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secure a consensus."96 The new version is as follows:
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone (and
continental shelf) between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement in
accordance with international law. Such an agreement
shall be in accordance with equitable principles,
employing the median or equidistance line, where
appropriate, and taking into acco~~t all circumstances
prevailing in the area concerned.
As Bernard Oxman, reporting on the session commented, the proposal
was greeted with cries of anguish from the most vocal
advocates of the two opposing points of view. The
text changed the words of the ICNT. What else is
changed is a matter upon which even the most
courageous may hesitate to speculate. 98
In commenting on the prospects for a resolution of the problem, he
continues somewhat optimistically that "it does seem possible that
agreement might be reached on a few wording changes."

However, another

cornmentator states that the delimitation question "has now proved to be
one of the most intractable, hard core issues in the entire proceedings
of UNCLOS III," and that "prospects for agreement at the Tenth Session do
not look at all bright."99 He expects that a formula will finally be
adopted, "but that it will be so vague and contentious as to be virtually
worthless. 1110.0
In summary, the international attempts over the past half a century
have been unsuccessful at drawing up a systematic set of delimitation
rules. As the law regarding the nature and extent of coastal state
jurisdiction has been evolving during this period, the possibility of
such a framework being devised has become more distant despite increased
efforts over the past decade. The problem becomes even greater as more
countries realize the increasing economic value of offshore areas. This
awareness results in an increased reluctance to accept a general set of
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rules which would potentially reduce the area to which they would be
entitled if the boundary delimitation were conducted as a unique event,
independent of any overriding rules.
The conclusion is evident that

wit~

or without a Law of the Sea

Treaty, the boundary delimitation process will continue in essentially
the same manner as in the past. Those boundaries which will result in
the apportionment of valuable resources, oil, for example, and soon DTEC,
will often be the subject of heated disputes where even a third party
decision will not necessarily resolve the issue. As more marine
resources are developed, and their economic value increases, solutions
will be more difficult to reach because countries will be less willing to
give up their claims.

The following discussion will examine what effect

DTEC commercialization in the next decade will have on maritime boundary
delimitation in the Caribbean Sea, and conversely what constraints to
that commercialization will result from disputed maritime claims.
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CHAPTER IV
Introduction to the Analysis

A.

The Need for this Study
The prospect of extracting renewable energy from ocean water will

probably have a significant impact on the political relations among the
countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea. Exploitation of the DTEC
resource may occur in one of two ways:

each country may try to maximize

its own potential to the exclusion of its neighbors; or countries may
cooperate on a regional or subregional basis in which national boundaries
are less significant. Whether a regional arrangement concerned with
joint DTEC exploitation can evolve before the sea becomes completely
divided into areas of exclusive national jurisdiction is unlikely.
Several regional organizations already exist in the area to deal, for
example, with marine scientific research (IDCARIBE), fisheries
conservation and development (WECAFC), and to promote economic
development in the member countries (CARICDM).

However, the success of
these and other regional programs has yet to be proven. 1D1
The Caribbean Sea has been identified as a "semi-enclosed sea."lD2
The countries bordering on semi-enclosed seas have been encouraged at
UNCLDS III to cooperate with one another in the exploitation of the
living resources of the sea, the preservation of the marine environment,
and the undertaking of scientific research. 1D3 But even if some
regional DTEC-re1ated organization is initiated in anticipation of
commercialization, its management and regulatory potential are
questionable.

The future of marine regional organizations in general,

and the Caribbean is no exception, is summarized by Dr. Alexander:
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given the relative lack of support by most countries
of the world for developmental type regional regimes,
and the increasingly politicized United Nations
system, it would seem that such regional systems face
an uncertain future in the near term. If the systems
themselves are not viable, their impacts will not be
particularly strong. Fisheries, environmental,
scientific and other regional arrangements will not
disappear; most will continue and some new ones may
develop, but their regulatory powers will be minimal.
And what of the long-term prospects? The answer
depends on the types of relationships neighboring
states have with one another in the closing years of
the Twentieth Century. It is possible that the current
nationalism will continue and that viable economic
and/or political organizations on the multinatioDal
scale will 'still be limited to only a few areas. 104
Based on the history of the Caribbean, the awareness of the value of
the OTEC resource will more likely feed the forces of nationalism rather
than foster regional cooperation in management and development. The
importance of maritime boundaries will increase because they will no
longer simply be symbols of a regional power struggle but will directly
impact the economic development potential of each nation.

Countries will

become more assertive in their claims and be more willing to dispute
extended claims, of their neighbors. This is an inherently negative trend
because exploitation of the resource in the disputed area, which is the
catalyst of the problem, will be extremely risky for either country.

The

following analysis will determine if such a threat exists regarding OTEC
in the Caribbean, and what the extent of the issue is.
This thesis relies on three basic assumptions. First, OTEC will
become a commercially viable, exportable technology in the next ten to
fifteen years.

Second, the law of the sea regarding maritime

jurisdiction which has emerged over the past fifteen years or so (namely,
the EEZ concept) will remain as the international law in force whether or
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not a global treaty is passed.

The third assumption is that the law of

maritime boundary delimitation will not become so well defined as to be
systematically applicable to all situations, leading to continued
potential for prolonged and intensified disputes.

The first three

Chapters were written to support each of these assumptions, respectively.
This study is necessary because the Caribbean has been identified as
an early target region for OTEC commercialization, yet no detailed analysis of the maritime claims and disputes in the area has been made in relation to OTEC.

In May, 1979, a "Thermal Resource Report" was published

for a Caribbean Sea Plantship in the area 13 0 _ is? N, 7S()- 800 W. lOS
The report described in detail the physical parameters relevant to OTEC
operations, but made no mention of the jurisdictional claims in the area,
which is in fact one of the more hotly contested parts of the Caribbean,
as will be shown.

In January, 1981, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Commercial OTEC was Published. 106 This document contained a
totally erroneous interpretation of the maritime boundaries in the candidate plantship area, implying that the study area was "high seas" outside
the jurisdiction of any country.

The map is copied in Figure 6. 107

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are also prime candidate
. areas for early OTEC commercialization. 108 The proposals which have
been discussed up to now for these areas involve nearshore plants in
clearly undisputed waters, but the potential exists for plantship deployment further offshore.

In other words, boundary disputes may not be an

immediate constraint on early OTEC plants, which will be sited nearshore
or actually on land, but will intensify once the offshore potential is
realized.

Foreknowledge of the jurisdictional status of the waters in

the boundary zones is necessary in planning a deployment strategy.
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This analysfs covers the entire Caribbean region and therefore is
applicable not only to domestic OTEC development but also to the export
of OTEC technology to any of the Caribbean countries.

As the cost of

OTEC is reduced, through a learning curve savings and economies of scale
of plant construction, more markets for the technology will emerge. The
preliminary results of a Department of Energy/State Department jointly
funded study indicate that there is significant market potential for OTEC
in the Caribbean in the 1986-2010 framework. 109

B. Methodology
This study was not intended to make a comprehensive resource
assessment of the region.

In order to do this, limiting factors such as

surface and subsurface currents, biological productivity, chemical
composition, and extreme meteorological conditions have to be considered
in addition to the thermal structure of the waters.

Instead this study

is designed to evaluate the distribution of one additional limiting
factor, namely jurisdiction disputes, which has not yet been considered
in detail.

Therefore the only physical parameters of concern are

bathymetry and the thermal gradient up to 1000 meters deep.
The primary source of the thermal data was the Guide to CICAR Data
pUblished by NOAA under the Cooperative Investigations of the Caribbean
and Adjacent Regions.Project. 110 In this Atlas, average annual
temperature is charted on 2 degree squares at 12 standard depths.

The

two aspects of the thermal structure significant to this thesis were
determined to be the depth at which the average annual ~ T equals 200 C,
and the f::a T at 1000 meters (the cold water pipe standard desi gn depth).
This information was manually extrapolated from the information in the
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Guide and the results cross checked with other, less detailed sources.
112
Bathymetric data was obtained from U.S. Navy Hydrographic Charts.

111

The primary sources for maritime boundary information were the Limits
in the Seasl 13 series, published by the State Department, and, when
available, treaties and other documents.

"The Regional Sea: A Theoreti-

cal Division of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea," by Capone and
Ryan was the primary source for the hypothetical equidistance and median
lines. 114 This information was cross checked with other, less detailed
maps which have occasionally appeared in the literature. 115
Since many of the maritime boundary problems involve disputed titles
to small islands, rather than merely the method to be used in the
delimitation and the effect to be given those islands, the history of the
claims and counter claims had to be compiled. There were numerous
sources for each case, and these will be identified in the discussions.
Arguments on both sides will be presented as completely as possible, but
no attempts will be made to judge the validity of either claim.
The mapping phase of the project involved the design and production
of maps which are of sufficient detail to enable a clear presentation of
I

the material without either oversimplifying or overcomplicating the
data.

The maps are indexed in Figure 7. The disputed areas are

identified by shading, although in most cases the outer limits were
arbitrarily drawn because no specified bounds were available.

In

addition, where no claims or counter claims have been publicized, no
shading was applied even though the potential for a dispute exists along
every undelimited boundary. Where more than one dispute exists on a
particular map, the areas were numbered for reference to the textual
discussion.
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Once the maps were prepared the analysis began. Although a
quantitative measurement of the area involved in the disputes would have
been the ideal, the cost of accuracy in such an analysis was beyond the
budget of this project.

In addition, since the outer limits of the

shading were essentially arbitrary, the validity of a quantitative
analysis would have been questionable.

Instead, a qualitative assessment

was made, with the footnote that a certain degree of freedom exists in
the interpretation.
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CHAPTER V
OTEC and Maritime Boundary Disputes in the Caribbean Sea

A.

The Thermal Resource
The OTEC thermal resource is distributed throughout the Caribbean Sea

wherever the depth of the water is sufficient.
(38 out of 70 2 degree

squa~es)

Over half of the region,

has an average annual

~

T greater than

20° C available within 700 meters of the surface, see Figure 8a.

Except

in the anomalous Venezuelan coast area, the entire sea has an average
annual thermal gradient greater than 21 0 C between the surface and 1000
meter depth wherever that or greater depth exists, see Figure 8b. On
this basis the 700 m depth contour was selected as the standard reference datum for the final maps.

The reader should keep in mind that the

OTEC cold water pipe does not necessarily have to be vertically deployed,
which means that this reference line is not an absolute limit to OTEC
facility deployment.

B. The Eastern Caribbean
The eastern Caribbean Sea (Figure 9) is an extremely complex area
from the point of view of maritime boundary delimitation.

There are at

least 30 potential EEZ boundaries in an area approximately 120,000 sq.
miles, of which only two have been delimited. Although the process of EEZ
delimitation has only recently begun there, the increase in the economic
value of the waters resulting from the emergence of OTEC as a viable
energy source may bring this issue to the forefront of the regional
political scene within the upcoming decade. The presence of so many
relevant or special circumstances (most of the islands are zone-locked)
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creates the possibility that many of the boundary negotiations will take
a number of years to complete. However, since the special circumstances
are common'to so many of the countries or

t~rritories,

the parties will

be negotiating from essentially the same (disadvantaged) position.

The

greatest question facing the region, therefore, is the effect to be given
Aves Island in the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between
Venezuela and each of the surrounding islands. This issue is deeply
entangled in the regional politics and is not strictly a series of
bilateral problems.
Aves Island is a I/modest extension of sand covered by purslane (500 m
x 150 m max. x 50 mmin.),1/116 15 ft. high and situated approximately
125 miles west and southwest of the Leeward Islands and 350 miles north
of the coast of Venezuela. The island is the only portion of the Aves
Ridge to emerge from the sea and as such does not belong to any of the
various geologic units which form the bases for the other Caribbean
islands.

Until now the island's only economic resource has been guano

which was used for fertilizer, however the presence of an OTEC-qua1ity
thermal gradient 10-15 miles offshore will increase the island's economic
potential in upcoming years.

Again Aves Island could become a source of

fertilizer, only this time it would be OTEC produced ammonia instead of
biologically produced guano.
,

The first discovery of Aves is not known, and the first occupation
did not occur until the middle of the 19th century.
Its specific discovery and actual possession by Spain
were doubtful, except as one of the Windward group.
If it was included in the ancient audiencia of Santo
Domingo, it was transferred by Spanish Royal Ordinance
of June 13, 1786, to the audiencia of Caracas. It was
visited in May 1835 by the British ship Race Horse,
and for many years the inhabitants of the Dutch West
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Indies islands of Saba and St. Eustatius were accustomed to visit Aves annually to take turtles and birds·
eggs. In March 1854 and thereafter the brigantine
John R. Dow, Captain N.P. Gibbs, and other vessels

belonging to Lang and Delano, and Shelton and Company

of Boston went to the island to load guano. 117

At that time the deposit on Aves was only the second known source of
guano on the eastern side of the continent. 118
In December of 1854, a Venezuelan naval schooner arrived and its
Captain raised a Venezuelan flag over the island.

By the end of the

month the Venezuelan government had succeeded in forcing the evacuation
of She1ton·s laborers and had meanwhile granted a guano concession to
another American, J.D. Wallace, under a commercial arrangement. 119
In January120 and May121 of 1855 Shelton appealed to the U.S.
government for assistance and protection, claiming that the island
belonged to the United States.

He pointed out that title to sovereignty

was based, in international law, not only on discovery but also on
occupation; his was the first known permanent occupation of the island.
During this same period Wallace had not kept up with his payments to the
Venezuelan government and his concession was annulled.

By September,

1855, with the help of the U.S. government, the' Wallace concession was
reinstated. 122 The U.S. then proceeded to pressure the Venezuelan
government for compensation for the U.S. citizens who had been expelled
(Lang &Delano, and Shelton and Co.).

By 1859, Venezuela agreed to pay

$130,000 for a full settlement of the claims, and the U.S. agreed to
desist from any further claims to Aves.
The Dutch claim to Aves arose at the time of Venezue1a·s first act of
sovereignty there, when the U.S. citizens were expe11ed. 123 Their
argument was based (in error) on the claim that Aves was part of the same
sand bank as Saba, and also that Dutch fishermen were the only people to
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frequent the island prior to the discovery of guano there. 124 The
dispute was submitted for arbitration to the Queen of Spain in 1860.

In

1865 the Queen ruled that Aves was the property of Venezuela as part of
the Captaincy-General of Caracas from which Venezuela inherited its
territory.

In a vague ruling, the Queen, admitting Spain had never

occupied the island, noted that Venezuela was the first to keep an armed
force there, and the first to exercise acts of sovereignty.

However, the

award included an obligation to indemnify the Dutch fishermen if they
should be prohibited from fishing there.
The subsequent obscure hjstory of the island is summarized by Dr.
Eric Williams:
President Guzman Blanco (of Venezuela), in creating
the new Federal District of Colon by decree of 1871
imposing a" special regime, did not include Bird
Island. Bird Island was not included in the Federal
District until 1895, by decree of President Crespo;
the inclusion was repeated by President Castro in 1905
when some British troops landed on the island for
target practice. Nothing much resulted, until in 1950
the dictator Perez Jimenez took military possession of
Bird Island. Scientists suggested the establishment
of a bird sanctuary. 125
By the mid-1970's, however, developments in the law of the sea regarding
maritime jurisdiction brought Aves back into international significance.
The current issue is no longer a question of sovereignty, for that
appears to have been settled for a century, but one of whether Aves
Island is entitled to an EEl at all, or to equal status as a small island
state in EEl delimitation negotiations.

Venezuela, in an effort to
,

strengthen its regional economic and political power, was quick to
establish as many supporting factors as possible in order to legitimize a
broad EEl claim using Aves as a full effect basepoint.
The Institute of Marine Technology and Science
(INTECMAR) of Simon Bolivar University issued a
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Seperata of the University's Bulletin to raise the
issue. Two hypothetical maps illustrated what the El
of Venezuela would be with and without Aves Island, a
difference that amounts to one third of the total.
Thousands of copies were freely distributed and
reprinted by other universities, schools, and
associations. The press joined the Aves campaign
while a "Frontier Group" among students at Central
University took it upon itself to back the claim.
FUDENA, the Venezuelan affiliate of the World Wildlife
Fund, launched its own campaign to save the fauna and
flora of Aves Island. President Perez' government
later announced that the island would be provided with
a permanent oceanographic research base to be maintained and operated all the year round under the navy's
protection. President Perez inaugurated the new
research base on October 18, 1978, as he announced the
acquisition of a research vessel. 26
Venezuela's claim to an EEl utilizing Aves as a full effect basepoint was
further legitimized in 1978 when boundary treaties were concluded with
both the United States and the Netherlands Antilles.
The United States-Venezuela Treaty, signed March 28, 1978,
established a maritime boundary using geodesic lines whose turning points
are essentially equidistant between Aves and Puerto Rico or the U.S.
Virgin Islands. 127 The Netherlands Antilles-Venezuela maritime
boundary agreement, signed just two days 1ater also estab 1i shed an
equidistance boundary betwe~n Aves and Saba. 128 These agreements
represented a definite shift in policy, especially for the U.S.,
regarding maritime boundary delimitation.
Aves Island is a paradigm of the "special circumstance" warranting a
boundary based on equitable principles yet the United States and the
Netherlands Antilles both agreed to equidistance boundaries without any
apparent

di~p~te.

As Robert Hodgson, former Geographer of the United

States, once wrote:

"restrictions must be placed upon the use of certain

small islands in order to remove or reduce their distortions and to
iv l t les
.
preserve a semblance of equity." 129 Base d on t he act lVl
at
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UNCLOS III, the point must have been apparent to the U.S. negotiating
team that in any third party settlement of a boundary dispute, Aves would
not very likely be given full effect. As Donald Karl commented in 1977:
The common thread running through almost all of the
draft articles submitted at the Conference was a belief
that factors such as population, size, economic viability, geographical configuration, and distance from
the mainland, as well as the political status of an
island should be considered when maritime bQijndaries
are affected by the presence of an is1and. 13U
Clearly Aves ranks low on every criterion, yet without hesitation the
equidistance boundaries were accepted.
Discovering the motivation behind these agreements involves a10t of
speculation because of the lack of pUblished information on the
negotiations. One possible factor which immediately comes to mind is
oil.

Venezuela is by far the region1s largest producer of oil with an

annual production of approximately 800 million barrels and an estimated
reserve of nearly 18 billion barre1s. 131 Although Venezuela, an OPEC
member, provided only 3% of all U.S. crude imports in 1977 and 1978 132.
the Venezuelan government has maintained a favorable oil policy toward
the U.S. (such as not participating in the 1972-73 Arab OPEC oil
embargo). A second possible motivation for the shift in U.S. delimitation
policy regarding small islands is the desire to establish a precedent for
the delimitation of other U.S. maritime boundaries where small islands
are present.

One area where this may be the case is in the Northern

Pacific/Bering Sea region between the Aleutian Islands and the Soviet
mainland. The po]icy adopted by the U.S. and the Netherlands Antilles is
not necessarily going to be automatically followed by the other countries
who are in the vicinity of Aves.
Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and an
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outspoken advocate of eastern Caribbean independence and self-determination movements, spoke in 1975 of the broad economic and political issues
which are linked to Venezuela's domination of the Caribbean Sea. The
problem as he sees it is:
Venezuela's Caribbean V1Slon and ambitions, starting
off from barren uninhabited rocks to a network of
economic arrangements out of which is emerging a
Ven~zue1an oil and industrial metropolis and an
indebted Caribbean hinterland, the Caribbean as we
know it integrated into Venezuela, the naval power of
the future, the oil power of the present, the tourist
mecca in the making; its position in its Venezuelan
Sea fortified by its 200 mile exclusive economic zone. 133
In reference specifically to Aves Island he urged that the Caribbean
people
must tak~ (sic) it absolutely clear that we cannot, in
the international Law of the Sea, agree to subordinate
the rights of former colonial peoples to share equitably in the heritage of their common matrimonial Caribbean Sea, to deprive established island communities of
their fundamental rights and essential economic
interests for the sake of barren uninhabited rocks (no
temporary fishermen's shacks or the planting of a flag
can constitute habitation) or to abrogate those
rights in favor of birds, even with their droppings. 134
This speech was made in 1975, and now with the EEZ concept even more
widely accepted as a principle of international law, the question has
become one, not so much of whether the Caribbean will be divided into
segments of exclusive national jurisdiction, but how that division will
occur.

•

As Figure 8 shows, the thermal resource is distributed throughout the
eastern Caribbean. With
OTEC emerging as a realistic source of energy,
,
and a potential springboard for many island nations to move toward
economic independence and security,· the importance of the waters between
Aves and the surrounding islands will become much greater. There is an
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increased likelihood that these countries will advance maritime claims,
based on equitable principles which extend beyond the median line and
possibly up to a narrow territorial sea belt around Aves.

The area

shaded on Figure 9 represents that in which there will be greater risks
to OTEC deployment either by Venezuela or any other Caribbean country
because of the uncertain legal status of those waters.
The difficulties in this area are increased by the fact that only
four of the islands (or island groups) are independent, and only recently
so.

This situation creates the possibility that the mother countries of

the other territories will negotiate maritime boundaries in the broader
context of their relations with Venezuela, and not necessarily reflecting
the true interests of the island populations whose EEZ's will be traded
away.

This raises the question, which is beyood the scope of this thesis

to answer, but which is nonetheless significant to the deployment of an
OTEC facility with a lifetime of 20-30 years, namely if and when the
island territories attain independence will they uphold a boundary treaty
which was negotiated to satisfy the needs of the former colonial power
and not solely the interest of the colonized people?
If OTEC is proven to be the key to energy independence before the
boundaries are delimited, then the maritime claims will likely extend
beyond the equidistance line between Aves and the other islands.

If the

boundaries are negotiated prior to OTEC commercialization, on the other
hand, the potential remains for the agreements to be disputed by newly
independent states at some later time.

In any case, substantial areas

remain available for each potential island market within which there is
no jurisdiction question or potential dispute.
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C.

The East-Central Caribbean
Figure 10 shows the east-central Caribbean Sea between Puerto Rico

and the Dominican Republic on the north, and Venezuela, Colombia and the
"major" Netherlands Antilles (Aruba, Curacao, and Bonaire) on the south.
The OTEC thermal resource (Figure 8) extends from within a few miles off
the coast of the Dominican Republic (at the 700 m depth) south to the
South American Continental Shelf. Along the margin of shelf there is a
slight temperature anomaly, reducing the average
14 C. 135

T at 1000 m to only

Although over half of the potential EEZ boundaries (4 out of 7) have
already been delimited by agreement, there is still substantial
uncertainty regarding jurisdiction over a large portion of maritime
area.

The source of the problem is the long standing dispute between

Colombia and Venezuela over their maritime boundary in the Gulf of
Venezuela. (Dispute area 1, Figure 10) This dispute creates a situation
where a boundary outside of the potential OTEC area will be significant
to the apportionment of the thermal resource.
The maritime boundary dispute between Colombia and Venezuela can be
linked with the land boundary feud which existed for more than a century
after the breakup of the former province of Greater Colombia (which
included both areas) in 1825. 136 During that period there was considerable disagreement as to the location of the land boundary on the Goajira
Peninsula which forms the northwest coast of the Gulf of Venezuela, and
to the ownership of los Monjes Islands at the Gulf's mouth. Arbitration
awards in 1891, by the Queen of Spain, and 1922, by the President of the
Swiss Federal Council, were not acceptable to both parties. Resumed
bilateral negotiations ended in 1941 with a treaty establishing the
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current land boundary and ceding Los Monjes to Colombia. 137
However, during this time Venezuela was becoming aware of the
potential value of the oil in the continental shelf and showed an early
desire to complete the relevant delimitation in known oil regions.

In

1942 Venezuela and Great Britain signed the world's first submarine
boundary treaty in the oil rich Gulf of Paria between Venezuela and
Trinidad. 138 In 1939 Venezuela claimed that the Gulf of Venezuela was
a "historic bay" south of a closing line extending east from Castilette
(the eventual terminus of the land boundary). 139 If this claim were to
become accepted by the international community, the closing line would
become the baseline from which the territorial sea and continental shelf
would be measured seaward; the waters inland of the line would become

-'

Venezuela's internal waters.

Soon after the 1941 boundary agreement

Venezuela renewed its claim to Los Monjes, in part because of the islands'
value as basepoints in the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary.
The dispute intensified in 1951 when S. Whittemore Boggs pUblished an
article on the "Delimitationof Seaward Areas under National Jurisdiction. 1I 140
In a footnote in that paper, Boggs cited the Gulf of Venezuela as an
example of the effect which offshore islands might have on the
delimitation of an equidistance boundary.
in the Gulf:

He drew two equidistance lines

a "normal u jurisdictional line which disregarded Los Monjes

as a basepoint, and an "alternative" jurisdictional line which used Los
Monjes as a Venezuelan basepoint, thereby shifting the so-called normal
boundary from a roughly northerly course to northwesterly and cutting off
the Colombian continental shelf at the

mout~

of the Gulf.

In his

discussion, however, Boggs failed to consider Venezuela's claimed

80
"historic bay" closing line. As a result, the boundary which was shown
extended Colombia's jurisdiction into Venezuela's claimed internal waters.
Since that time, the question of maritime jurisdiction in that area
has remained a point of dispute between the two countries.

Despite

periodic attempts at treaty negotiation, public opinion on both sides has
prevented final agreement on both related questions:

that of sovereignty

over Los Monjes, and that of the location of the maritime boundary.

In

1980 negotiators again reached an "accord" which included joint exploitation of shared oil reserves, but public reaction in both Colombia and
Venezuela prevented ratifiction, and further talks were abandoned. 141
As noted earlier, the current dispute does not involve an area of
potential OTEC facility deployment; however, the outcome of this
continental shelf/territorial sea issue will have a significant impact on
the delimitation of the extended EEl boundary.

The resolution of the

lateral boundary issue between Venezuela and Colombia will also enable
those two countries and the Dominican Republic to untangle the confused
situation in the median area where all three countries share borders,
(Dispute area number 2, Figure 10).

As the map shows, the Dominican

Republic has. negotiated two overlapping EEl boundaries, one with Colombia
and the other with Venezuela, neither of which coincides with the
Dominican Republic's own claimed EEl limit.
In September, 1977, the Dominican Republic adopted a law which
specified the turning points of their claimed EEl boundary.142 On
January 13, 1978, representatives from the Dominican Republic and
Colombia signed a maritime boundary treaty, but the line (an equidistance line) deviated slightly to the south of the Dominican Republic's EEl
line. 143 The boundary line also extended eastward to a point north of
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the Netherlands Antilles, in effect ignoring any Venezuelan basepoints
west of Aruba. Three and a half months. later, Venezuela concluded its
boundary treaty with the Netherlands Antilles establishing the lines
shown on Figure 10. 144 One year after that, on March 3, 1979, the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela signed their boundary agreement which
has resulted in the current confused state of affairs. 145 The
cumulative effect of these agreements has been the creation of a large
triangular zone within which large scale economic activity, by either
Colombia or Venezuela will

1~ke1y

arouse the protests of the other.

Resolution of this issue ultimately depends on the settlement of the Gulf
of Venezuela/Los Monjes dispute.
The Venezuela-Netherlands Antilles agreement is an interesting
example of how two states can establish an EEZ boundary which deviates
considerably from the hypothetical median line along parts of the course
in exchange for continental shelf concessions along other parts. The
hypothetical equidistance lines between Aruba and Venezuela's claimed Los
Monjes Islands in the west, and between Curacao and the Aves Islands (not
to be confused with Aves Island) in the east are shown on Figure 10.
Professor Nwiehed has commented that the boundaries along these sectors
were negotiated "S0 as to reflect the general contours of the parties'
coastlines, this Venezuelan advantage being compensated by a presumably
oil rich triangle ••• off the western tip of Aruba." 146 The implied
balance of this exchange will shift in favor of Venezuela when OTEC
becomes commercially available; however, any future changes in the
boundary treaty which the Netherlands Antilles may desire, on the grounds
that the circumstances have changed, will be difficult, if not impossible
to aChieve considering the substance of the agreement.
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"Article 1 states that the boundaries fixed by virtue of the treaty
delimit territorial waters, continental shelves, exclusive economic zones
or any other marine or submarine areas that have been or may be established by the contracting parties according to international law."147
In July, 1978, the Venezuelan Congress approved the Exclusive Economic
Zone Act which established among other things "sovereign rights for the
••• economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and wind ll 148 (emphasis
added). This action and the lack of protest from the Netherlands
Antilles government assures that the boundary treaty can not easily be
abandoned by the Netherlands Antilles, at least on the grounds that OTEC
is a new circumstance warranting a reexamination of the treaty.
A third area of potential dispute on Figure 10 (area number 3)
involves Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, the United States, and
possibly the Netherlands Antilles.

The issue involves a discrepancy

between the Dominican Republic's EEZ limit and the U.S. Fishery
Enforcement Limit which in effect left a triangular gap of "unclaimed"
ocean space in one area and overlapped the claims in others. 149 When
the U.S. and Venezuela signed their boundary agreement the westernmost
segment of the line did not terminate where the U.S. Fishery Limit takes
a turn to the north but continued Il along an azimuth of 274.23 degrees
true from point 22," (where the U.S. Fishery Limit changes course) "in
the event that the maritime boundary of the United States extends
westward, until the trijunction with a third state is reached.

In no

case shall this trijunction point be further westward than latitude 15
14 1 28" N longitude 68 51 1 44" w."150 This westwern limit is also the
final point in this sector of the Venezuela-Netherlands Antilles boundary,
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established two days later. 15l

However, a year later when Venezuela

concluded boundary negotiations with the Dominican Republic, the line
included a segment between 15 141 28" N 68 51 1 44" Wand 15 12 1 51" N
68 28 1 56" W(pt 22 in the U.S.-Venezuela bOundary).152 In other words
Venezuela established the same boundary line with both the U.S. and the
Dominican Republic. The resolution of the question of sovereign rights
in the triangular area bounded on the south by coincidental U.S. and
Dominican Republic boundaries (with Venezuela) depends on a lateral
boundary agreement between the two.

,

The size of the area involved in

compari son to the EEZ I s of each country is sma11, but the region in
question is a potential OTEC plantship area wherein early deployment will
be constrained by the jurisdiction issue.

D. The Central Caribbean
The central Caribbean, Figure 11, is bounded on the north by Jamaica,
Cuba and Haiti and on the south by Colombia.

The area also includes a

portion of the Dominican Republicls Economic Zone as a result of the
shape of the coastline at the southern terminus of the land boundary with
Haiti.

Navassa Island, between Jamaica and Haiti, is an uninhabited

former U.S. guano island over which the United States still claims
sovereignty.
The OTEC resource covers the entire region, but is noticeably better
in the southern half (see Figure 8). The area also includes the eastern
part of the U.S. OTEC Plantship Study area which the Department of Energy
selected for detailed resource evaluation. 153 Since this OTEC Study
,-.

Area is potentially within'the EEZls of at least two countries, extension
of the research program into the demonstration or commercialization stage
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will require a bilateral agreement. However, unlike the western half of
the Plantship Study Area, the part on Figure 11 is not in an active
dispute area even though the Jamaica-Columbia maritime boundary has not
yet been delimited.
Of the three identifiable potential dispute zones on Figure 11,
Number 1 involves the greatest area of maritime space.
involves two questions about Navassa Island:

The issue here

its sovereignty, and its

maritime boundaries before and after resolution of the sovereignty
question.

The ownership dispute, between the U.S. and Haiti, has

historically only 'tntermtt tent l y surfaced in relations between the two
countries, and the U.S. claim has never been relinquished.
Navassa Island, just over two square miles in area, lies about 30
miles west of Haiti and 85 miles east of Jamaica. Although currently
uninhabited, the island supported more than 100 Americans during the
guano mining period in the last-half of the 19th century.

Despite the

decline of the guano trade and subsequent evacuation of its inhabitants,
the island has retained significance due to its strategic position along
major shipping lanes from the Panama Canal to the Atlantic, and it now
serves as a lighthouse base.
Navassa Island was discovered by Peter Duncan of the United States on
July 1, 1857. 154 He took possession of it in September 1857, and, on
November 18th, petitioned the Secretary of State to declare it as appertaining to the United States pursuant to the Guano Act of 1856. 155 In
early 1858 the Haitian government sent two warships to Navassa to prevent
the mining operation from getting started. 156 Letters of protest were
exchanged periodically during the following months, and the U.S. sent
some naval forces to protect the American citizens from interference by
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Haiti.

On December 8, 1859, the Secretary of State issued a proclamation

stating that Edward Cooper, agent of Peter Duncan, "was entitled to all
the privileges and advantages intended" by the Guano Act. 157 In
February, 1869, a U.S. Treasury Department circular which was .issued to
the collectors of customs included Navassa as one of the guano islands
subject to U.S. regulations.

In 1871 a Massachusetts Court found, in

Whiton v. Albany and Narragansett Insurance Cos., that "the United States
had acquired, and had asserted against foreign governments, a title in
the island of Navassa by discovery and lawful possession, as authorized
by the law of nations."158

In response to repeated claiqls by Haiti

that Navassa was inherited from France upon independence in 1825, the
Secretary of State issued two letters, in 1872 and 1873, denying
the claim on the grounds that the U.S. was the first to discover and
occupy the island. 159 Haiti continued to include Navassa as part of
its territory in the Constitutions of 1874, 1888, and 1889. 160
In 1889, a riot among the laborers resulted in the axe murder of one
of the employees of the Navassa Phosphate Company. 161 The defendant
was found guilty but appealled on a writ of error that the U.S. courts
did not have jurisdiction over the case.

However, the Supreme Court, in

Jones v. U.S., held that the Guano Act was valid and constitutional, and
that Navassa must be considered as appertaining to the U.S. pursuant to
the Guano Act and other demonstrations of sovereignty; the Circuit Court
ruling was affirmed. 162 The labor unrest continued, and in 1891 the
marines aboard the U.S.S. Kearsarge landed to protect the lives and
property of the island's inhabitants. 163
In 1898 the Spanish government issued a complaint that Navassa was
being used as a transhipment point by the U.S. for arms and men to aid
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the insurgency in Cuba. 164 In 1898-1901, when the receiver of the
Navassa Phosphate Company sold its rights, the Haitians claimed that the
island had been abandoned by the U.S. and prevented the purchasers from
landing, upon which the U.S. declared that Navassa had not been abandoned.
At the turn of the century, the geographical significance of Navassa was
changing from a nearby source of guano to a strateqtc U.S. position in
the politically troubled central Caribbean. Navassa took on new
significance again a decade later with the completion of the Panama Canal
because of its position along the major shipping routes.
In 1913 Congress authorized the appropriation of $125,000 for the
construction of a lighthouse on Navassa. 165 This was followed in 1916
by a U.S. Presidential Proclamation reserving Navassa for lighthouse
purposes.1 66 Also in 1916, a new Haitian Constitution was adopted,
influenced by the U.S. presence there, which did not mention the names of
the "adjacent is1ands" under Haitian sovereignty. 167
In 1935 Haiti adopted another Constitution, however this one again
identified Navassa as part of Haitian territory. This action was taken
despite official protests from the U.S. government for at least three
years prior to the adoption of the new Constitution. 16B When, in 1946,
the Haitians were proposing yet another Constitution, the United States l
response was:

"thts claim (to Navassa) remains in the Constitution, but

this is a customary provision in previous Haitian Constitutions, and we
. 1y reservlng
. our rlg
. ht s. II 169
are S1mp
The status of Navassa in U.S.-Haitian relations around 1951 is
summarized in this excerpt from a Policy Statement prepared by the
Department of State
A further factor which occasionally gives rise to •••
misunderstanding is the long standing disagreement •••
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regarding sovereignty over Navassa •••• Since we are
in actual possession of Navassa and the Haitian
government does not Qress its claim, the matter is
usually quiescent. 17U
And quiescent the subject has remained since.

Navassa was not mentioned

in nine days of hearings in 1970 before the Subcommittee on Inter American
Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which covered all
aspects of the U.S. security posture in the Caribbean with special
emphasis on Cuba and the Panama Cana1. 171 The island was not explicitly
mentioned in the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act, although
the law can be interpreted as establishing a Fishery Enforcement Zone
around Navassa under the general term of "possessions" of the United
States. 172 In 1977, Senator Brooke submitted a Review of Factors
Affecting U.S. Diplomatic and Assistance Relations with Haiti to the
Committee on Appropriations but no mention of Navassa was made in the 133
page document. 173
The fact that Navassa was identified in the 1978 Hearings as one of
the U.S. Territories covered by the multilateral T1ate101co Protocol I
(to prohibit testing, use, manufacture, storage or deployment of nuclear
weapons in Latin America), indicates that the U.S. has not forgotten
Navassa a1together. 174 The status of Navassa in 1977 was summarized by
Dr. Roland I. Perusse:
The island remains uninhabited except by goats, cats,
rats, bats, lizards, and of course, thousands upon
thousands of birds. Haiti still considers the island
to be its possession, but has not pressed its claim,
presumably because the island is now considered to
have little economic value and the Haitian Government
is reluctant about taking over the expense and responsibility of servicing the lighthouse.
Navassa is kept under close surveillance by U.S.
authorities as a suspected marijuana drop point. It
is difficult to secure permission to visit the
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island. It is controlled by the Seventh Coast Guard
District in Miami, which must give its approval. One
must sign a document which reads in part, II acknowledge that I understand that there are many dangers
and hazards in visiting Navassa Island.... I do
hereby, for myself, my heirs, executors, and administrators, remise, release and forever discharge ••• the
United States of America ••• from any claim, demands
on account of my death or on account of any injury to
me which may occur from any cause. 117S
The emergence of OTEC as a commercial energy technology will alter the
economic value of Navassa and could again bring it to the surface of U.S.Haitian relations.

The proximity of the island to Jamaica, a principal

source of bauxite, makes Navassa a desirable U.S. possession as a
potential OTEC-powered aluminum refinery base.

However, the question

remains as to whether or not the U.S. will be able to retain its title to
the island should the sovereignty dispute go to a third party settlement
such as arbitration or the World Court.
No matter what the outcome of the sovereignty issue, there is still
some uncertainty about the maritime area to which the island is
entitled.

If the U.S. should retain possession, three boundary treaties

would have to be negotiated (with Jamaica, Cuba, and Haiti).

Clearly,

the application of the "special circumstances" concept would be
justified, implying that the negotiations would be more complicated than
usual.

On the other hand, if Haiti should finally attain recognition of

its title to the island, the boundary negotiations which would have to be
conducted with Jamaica have the potential of growing into a large scale
dispute considering the following factors:

the importance of the waters

between the two countries; Haitils historical relationship with the
island; and Haitils own claimed baseline and maritime boundary with Cuba.
176
In 1977 Haiti and Cuba concluded a maritime boundary agreement.
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The line was determined on the basis of the straight baselines of the
respective countries.

In 1972 Haiti had established its straight

baselines which included a segment enclosing the area between the two
prominent peninsulas but which did not extend to Navassa off the southern
point. 177 The maritime boundary with Cuba, however, extends into what
could become a U.S. Economic (or Fisheries) Zone around Navassa •
. The final resolution of the Navassa Island questions does not appear
near at hand despite the recent trend of three of the four countries
concerned (excluding Jamaica) toward delimitation of their respective
maritime boundaries.

As a result, GTEC is likely to become a factor in

this issue and will change the negotiating position of the parties
concerned in the upcoming decade. Until all relevant agreements are
finally concluded, however, Navassa and the surrounding waters should not
be considered as a potential OTEC deployment area despite its prime
aluminum refining potential.
The second area of possible dispute, number 2 on Figure 11, involves
the maritime boundary between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

The

Dominican Republic has claimed a maritime boundary which deviates slightly
(as shown) from the hypothetical equidistance line. 178 While Haiti has
not yet issued a counter-claim, the potential exists for such a claim to
extend into the Dominican Republic's EEZ on the grounds that the curvature
of the coastline in the area of the terminus of the land boundary is a
"special circumstance" following the ruling of the World Court in the
North Sea Cases. The effect of this physical circumstance is that a
Haitian economic zone determined solely by the equidistance method would
be narrow in relation to the length of its southern coastline. While the
potential for GTEC deployment in this region might fuel the dispute, the

91
area involved would be small compared to the overall economic zones of
both countries.

OTEC, therefore, is not likely to be of any great

significance to the maritime boundary issue. Additionally, since Haiti
/

has already agreed that its maritime boundary with Colombia begins to the
west of the Colombia-Dominican Republic Joint Fisheries and Research Zone
(at the terminus of the Colombia-Dominican Republic boundary); the
Dominican Republic-Haiti boundarywt ll most likely terminate at that
trijunction point. 179
Potential dispute area number three, Figure 11, involves Haiti,
Jamaica and Colombia.

In February, 1978, Colombia and Haiti signed an

agreement establishing an equidistance maritime boundary between them. 180
This line, however,

extends into the hypothetical economic zone of

Jamaica (based on equidistance lines between it, Colombia, and Haiti).
As a result of Jamaicals position of not accepting the exclusive economic
zone concept, though, no movement toward boundary delimitation has been
made.
When the Declaration of Santo Domingo was adopted in 1972, Jamaica
did not sign it. 181 At the Conference, Jamaica was urging the other
negotiators to consider a "matrimonial sea" concept rather than the
"patrimonial seall which was finally adopted. This alternative would have
provided for regional sharing of the seals resources rather than an
apportionment of them into exclusive national property. As of this date,
Jamaica has apparently not changed its position, and has not delimited
maritime boundaries with any of its neighbors.

Should Jamaica finally

accept the EEZ concept, the southern corner will be an area of potential
dispute as a result of the "encroachment" of Haiti and Colombia into
Jamaican maritime space.

The area concerned, however, is small and is
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not likely to have a significant impact on OTEC deployment, at least in
the near future because of the greater areas available for energy
production for each of the countries involved.

E. The Western Caribbean
Figure 12 (note the scale change) covers the western portion of the
Caribbean Sea between Central America, the Cayman Islands and Jamaica.
As a result of Colombia's claim to a number of banks, cays and small
islands in this area, the central portion of the map is dominated by the
Exclusive Economic Zone of Colombia.

Two of the three maritime

boundaries on this map which have already been delimited are based on
Colombia's title to those islands.
Colombia's claim,

whic~

However, Nicaragua does not accept

implies that the maritime area surrounding those

islands up to and including the Columbia-Panama and Colombia-Costa Rica
boundaries is a major potential dispute area.
The entire region is endowed with a premium OTEC resource base
wherever depths exceed 650-700 meters, see Figure 8. Most of the
countries bordering on this part of the Caribbean are provided with
considerable OTEC potential.

Nicaragua, however, would have only a small

corner of the OTEC resource if the existing jurisdictional regime were to
remain in the future.

Nicaragua's realization of the large energy/

economic benefits which could result from a successful
international
,
campaign to attain recognition of its claim to the disputed islands, will
likely encourage that country to become more forceful and assertive in
upcoming years.
The islands and cays in this area are small, varying in size up to
twenty square miles, and only the largest {Providencia, San Andres, and
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Great Corn Island) have supported any permanent population.

Based on the

history of the area, the disputed islands can be divided into two groups.
The northern group includes Roncador Cay, Serrana Bank, Serrani 11 a Bank,
and several other associated small islets.

The southern group consists

of the San Andres and Providencia Archipelago.

Over the past century or

so, the northern group has been claimed by both the United States and
Columbia, as well as by Nicaragua and Honduras, although these latter
countries performed no acts of sovereignty upon them and their claims
were essentially ignored.

The southern group has been consistently

claimed by Nicaragua and Colombia, although U.S. influence in the region
has been a primary factor in evolution of the current jurisdictional
regime.

Nicaragua has recently renewed its claim to these islands on the

grounds that this is the first time in over 70 years that the government
can exercise sovereignty over the territories independent of foreign
influence. 182
Colombia's claim to the islands in this region date back to ancient
Royal Spanish Decrees which placed the Mosquito Coast (now eastern
Nicaragua), the Mangles Islands (containing Great Corn Island), and the
San Andres and Providencia Archipelago under the jurisdiction of the
Captaincy General of New Grenada. 183 When the Latin American countries
became independent from Spain in the early 19th Century, the national
territories were generally agreed to be the same as the provincial
territories of the colonial era according to the principle of uti
posseditis, however, many of the boundaries were difficult or impossible
to locate.

During the 18oo's Colombia (which included modern Panama) and

Costa Rica made several attempts at establishing the boundary between
them. Treaties signed in 1856, 1865, and 1873, and an Arbitration Award
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in 1900, all recognized Colombia's sovereignty over the San AndresProvidencia Archipelago and Mangles Islands, however none of these
instruments ever entered into force.

The 1900 Arbitration Award nearly

became ratified, but just as the countries were in the process of
delineating the boundary specified by the Award, Panama broke away from
Colombia and the question of a Colombia-Costa Rica boundary ceased to
exist.

Panama never expressed any interest in the islands.

Colombia actually exercized little sovereignty over the islands until
1914, when it requested the British and Dutch governments to require
their nationals to obey Colombian fishing laws in the waters around
Providencia and San Andres. 184 Since 1890 Nicaragua had argued that
the islands belonged to them.

The Nicaraguan government refused to

accept the 1900 award because it was not party to the arbitration.

A

secret U.S.-Nicaragua agreement in 1913 was followed a year later by the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty which included, among other provisions, a grant to
the U.S. to construct a Naval Base on Great Corn Island.

Colombia

protested in 1916 that the Mangles Islands were not Nicaragua's to give
away.
The dispute over ownership of the islands continued, and in 1924
. Colombia proposed a solution ceding the Mangles Islands to Nicaragua, and
the other islands to Colombia.

Nicaragua rejected this proposal and

continued to press its claim to the San Andres-Providencia Archipelago.
The U.S. became the mediator in the dispute and urged Nicaragua to accept
the 1924 proposal (which, incidentally, assured that the U.S. title to
Great Corn Island would remain in force).

During this period, however,

the U.S. was an instrumental force in Nicaraguan internal affairs through
its economic, administrative, and military presence there.
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In 1928 Colombia and Nicaragua signed a treaty at Managua which gave
the Mosquito Coast and Mangles Islands to Nicaragua, and the San AndresProvidencia Archipelago to Colombia.

Ratification by Colombia was prompt

but the Nicaraguan Congress was reluctant to agree to this relinquishment
of territorial claims.

u.S. political influence was strong enough,

though, that the treaty was finally ratified in late 1929.
One element of the Managua Treaty was that it did not consider the
status of the "northern group" of islands (Roncador, Serrana, etc.) which
had since 1910 been a matter of dispute between Colombia and the United
States.

In 1919 President Woodrow Wilson had proclaimed that those cays

and islands appertained solely to the U.S. pursuant to the Guano Act and
subsequent occupation by U.S. guano interests.

The lighthouses construc-

ted there by the U.S. in that same year were considered critical to the
safe navigation of the Panama Canal traffic.

In order to avoid complicat-

ing the dispute over these islands by recognizing any Nicaraguan claim,
the U.S. succeeded in separating them from the San Andres-Providencia
Archipelago in the 1928 Managua Treaty.

A month after the Treaty was

signed by Nicaragua and Colombia, the U.S. and Colombia exchanged
·dip10matic notes which declared that the status guo would be maintained
on the cays in question (namely, Colombians could fish there while the
U.S. would maintain the lighthouses) and the sovereignty issue would
remain unanswered. 185
At this point Honduras, which had at one time disputed ownership of
the "northern group" of islands with

N~caragua,

renewed its claim.

Honduras' original claim dated back to 1868-1869 when it had unsuccessfully protested the U.S. guano concession.

Both the U.S. and Colombia

refused to recognize any Honduran rights in the area and this claim has
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apparently not been resurrected.
In fact the issue was quiet until the mid-1970's, when developments
in the law of the sea renewed the importance of the islands by the effect
they would have on maritime boundary delimitation.

In 1976 and 1977,

Colombia signed boundary agreements with Panama and Costa Rica, respectively, which gave nearly full effect to the San Andres-Providencia Archipelago as Colombian basepoints. 186 Colombia has not yet delimited
boundaries on the northern side of the region but, even though the U.S.Colombian agreement is still in force,187 there is a likelihood that
they will claim sovereignty over the banks in question for the purpose of
EEZ delimitation and that the U.S. will not press its claim as long as
the aids to navigation are maintained.
The issue of sovereignty over the northern group of islands, as well
as those in the San Andres-Providencia Archipelago, is likely to reemerge
in the near future as a result of Nicaragua's new position regarding the
1928 Managua Treaty •. The new phase of this old dispute became internationally publicized during the annual statements of the representatives
from Colombia and Nicaragua before the UN General Assembly in October,
1980.
The Colombian Ambassador, Diego Uribe-Vargas charged that:
Nicaragua was trying to disregard the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. It was unilaterally attempting
to repudiate the validity of the Esguerra-Barcenas
Treaty of 1928 which defined the territorial dispute
between the two States. Any attempt on the part of
Nicaragua to repudiate that Treaty would be unprece~
dented. The Treaty with Nicaragua had been signed and
subsequently approved in both countries in full compliance with all constitutional requirements. The abortive attempt by the present Nicaraguan Government to
abrogate arbitrarily that Treaty with Colombia
deserved the repudiation of the international community
because it was an attempt to disregard law and alter
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the situation of friendly relations between the two
peoples. Colombia's juridical claim was based on
prevailing law, which fully interDreted the principles
of uti posseditis juris of 1810. 188
The reply of the Nicaraguan representative was that
while his country had warm feelings for Colombia, that
did not prevent Nicaragua from defending its territorial integrity. Nicaragua was nullifying the BarcenasEsguerra Treaty after fifty years because it was
signed and ratified during the United States occupation of Nicaragua; the presence of more than 5000
United States marines subordinated Nicaragua's
national interest to the strategic interests of the
occupying power; the Treaty was contrary to Nicaragua's
national constitution which prohibited cession of any
part of its territory; there were no boundary conflicts
with Colombia since they were not neighbors; Nicaragua's declaration of the nullity of the Treaty was the
logical corro1lary of the new right and ability of the
people of Nicaragua to act ~ith sovereignty for the
first time in 70 years; and when treaties were the
~~s~~~ ~~ i~~~~~~v~~~18~erence they were null and void
While the apparent reasoning behind Nicaragua's recent action is
political, there is a potential economic motivation in OTEC for pressing
this argument further.
As noted earlier, maritime boundaries established on the basis of
existing claims to the islands and cays in this region would reduce
Nicaragua's OTEC resource base to only a small portion of its EEZ.
Colombia, on the other hand, would benefit enormously in terms of OTEC
potential from an EEZ calculated using these islands as full effect
basepoints. The realization of this potential by either country will
cause a solution to the boundary question to be more difficult to attain.
The effect of this issue becoming more aggravated is that neither country
will be able to deploy OTEC facilities in the disputed area without
risking retaliatory action by the other. This may occur at an early stage
in the OTEC commercialization program since the U.S. has already targeted
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a section of the disputed region as a P1antship Study Area. 190 (See
Figure 12.)

The fact that such a dispute has arisen should be sufficient

cause in itself for the U.S. to discontinue consideration of this area as
a target region for early OTEC commercialization.

F. The Northwestern Caribbean
Figure 13 covers the northwestern corner of the Caribbean Sea between
Mexico, Cuba, the Cayman Islands, Honduras, Guatemala and the newly
independent country of Belize.

In 1976 Mexico established the limits of
its EEl and signed a maritime boundary agreement with Cuba. 191 Even
though all the remaining maritime boundaries have yet to be established,
there is only one area where sufficient evidence exists to identify a
potential dispute zone. This one dispute, however, is extremely complex
in that it involves three countries (Guatemala, Belize, and Honduras) and
several separate issues.

These issues include a question of sovereignty

over some small cays, seabed and fishing rights, and the right of access
to the high seas.

There is a prime ocean thermal resource in part of

this disputed area which implies that if the conflict is not resolved
prior to OTEC commercialization, a final agreement may be more difficult
to attain.
Belize, known formerly as British Honduras, became officially
independent on September 21, 1981 after nearly 350 years of British
occupation.

During the first 200 years of that period there were

repeated attempts by Spanish colonists to force the evacuation of the
British whose primary interest was in the lumber resources of the
region.

In 1763 an agreement was signed by which the British obtained

recognition 'of the right to cut lumber while acknowledging Spanish
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sovereignty over the territory.192
In 1779 the Spanish joined the American colonists' rebellion against
the British and nearly succeeded in eliminating the entire British
presence in

Belize~

The Treaty of Versailles signed in 1783 at the end

of the American Revolution included a provision which specified the
geographical limits of the British lumbering rights not previously
. established. These limits were not satisfactory to the British lumbering
interests and subsequent negotiations produced the 1786 London
Convention. This agreement called for the evacuation of the British from
the Mosquito Coast and other territories in the region in exchange for an
enlarged servitude in Belize.

Ten years later Britain and Spain were at

war again t and in 1798 a Spanish naval force failed in attempting to
force the evacuation of the British from Belize. The Treaty of Madrid t
signed in 1814 at the end of the wart established trade agreements on the
basis of conditions existing prior to the wart namely the Treaties of
1783 and 1786. 193
During the early 19th CenturYt Spanish colonialism was on the decline
and the newly independent countries were establishing their territorial
limits according to the principle of uti posseditis.

The United States

had issued the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to prevent European expansionism
in the void left by the Spanish withdrawal from the Western

Hemisphere~

Against these forces t Britain was trying to secure the foothold it had
established in Belize.
In 1859 an Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty was signed t establishing the
boundary between the two countries and including an obligation for both
countries to cooperate in the construction of a land/water link between
the capital of Guatemala and the city of Belize on the Atlantic coast.
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Guatemala, caught up in a war with El Salvador, was unable to ratify the
Treaty, and in 1867 Britain released herself from the treaty
obligations. Guatemala's reply was that the boundary provisions were
also, therefore, not binding, and that the British rights in the area, if
any at all, were limited to the lumber servitude established in the 1786
London Convention. 194 These positions have remained since, however, in
1862 Belize was "officially gazetted as a colony governed by Jamaica, and
later in 1871 it was accorded the status of a Crown Co10ny."195
Following several Guatemalan attempts to bring the issue to some sort of
reconciliation, the dispute "sank into something of a state of
ob1ivion. n196
The issue was revived in the 1930's when Guatemala suggested several
..

\.",..;

options which

mi~ht

finally settle the matter.

The options involved one

country's purchasing the territory from the other, but should Britain
elect to pay Guatemala in order to retain the Colony, there must also be
a guarantee of Guatemalan access to the sea. These negotiations were
interrupted by World War Ii and at the end of the War, Guatemala
intensified its claims.
In the Guatemalan Constitution of 1945, and again in 1965, Belize was
claimed as national territory. Also in 1965, the sovereignty dispute
went to arbitration with an American lawyer acting as the mediator.

The

draft treaty which emerged would have granted a limited form of
independence to Belize, with certain cooperative political and
administrative connections to Guatemala.

However, when the proposed

Treaty was publicized in 1968 there was rioting in the streets of Belize,
197
and both Britain and Guatemala rejected the Award.
With the continued demise of British colonialism in the 1960's and
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1970's, the question of Belize's independence continued to reemerge.

The

self-determination movement was strongly supported in the United Nations
where a growing number of newly independent countries were able to
present a unified stance on the issue.

In May, 1980, exploratory talks
were held between Great Britain and Guatemala on the Belize question. 198
Guatemala

~as

reluctant to recognize the independence of Belize without

some form of territorial concession and a guarantee of access to the high
seas.

The Belizean government was determined to deal with the issues

separately.
resolution

In November of 1980 the UN General Assembly adopted a
c~lling

for .the independence of Belize by the end of 1981; the

vote was 139 to none with seven abstentions (Guatemala was not present
for the vote). 199
By February, 1981, the- Guatemalan government began to realize that
Belize was becoming increasingly unwilling to relinquish any of its
territory in exchange for independence. At the same time, the Guatemalan
President acknowledged that the strong international support for Belizean
self-determination had left his country almost totally isolated. AngloGuatemalan talks resumed in early March with a Belizean representative
present.

The meetings produce 16 heads (points) of agreement which were

published on March 16. The agreement included the following provisions:
••• 2) Guatemala shall be accorded such territorial
seas as shall ensure permanent and unimpeded access to
the high seas, together with rights over the seabed
thereunder.
3) Guatemala shall have the use and enjoyment of
Ranguana and Sapodilla Cays (the two southernmost cays
off the Belize coast), and rights in those areas of
the sea adjacent to the cays as may be agreed.
4) Guatemala shall be entitled to free port facilities
in Belize City and Punta Gorda •
. •• , 7) In areas to be agreed an agreement shall be
concluded between Belize and Guatemala for purposes
concerned with the control of pollution, navigation
and fishing.
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8) There shall be areas of the seabed and the
continental shelf to be agreed for joint exploration
and exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons •
••• 10) Belize shall be entitled to any free port
facilities in Guatemala to match ~imi1ar facilities
provided to Guatemala in Be1ize. 2 0
Provisions were also made for cooperation in road improvement, pipeline
construction, and mutual security guarantees.
The publication of the heads of agreement elicited protests from
Honduras on at least three of the points (numbers 2,3, and 8).201
Honduras argued that it had a long standing, but dormant claim to
sovereignty over the cays which were mentioned, and that the granting of
sea areas and seabed rights could "1 ead to situations of conflict to the
detriment of Honduras' legitimate rights and the validity and permanence
of the treaties that are to be signed. 1I 202 Mr. Price, Premier of
Belize, responded that the Honduran claim was an "alleged right that has
never been in effect," and that the granting to Guatemala lithe use and
enjoyment" of the cays did not derogate from Belizean sovereignty over
them.

Regarding number 2 of the heads of agreement, he noted that the

purpose of that provision was to "assure Guatemala that Belize will not
extend maritime limits of three miles to 12 miles, together with the
ocean floor ••• and in this way Guatemala can have free access to the
h~gh seas. 1I203 This outright rejection of the Honduran claims has left
this phase of the dispute simmering; no further action by either side has
yet been published.
A constitutional conference was called for April 6th, 1981, to be
held in London.

However, public opposition to the heads of agreement

intensified in Belize and a state of emergency was declared there.

The·

grounds on which the opposition was based were that the proposed agreement
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was a "sell-out" of Belizean interests, and that the granting of the "use
and enjoyment ll of certain cays and seabed areas amounted to a territorial
concession.

By early September, Guatemala

r~newed

its old claim to the

entire territory of Belize and broke off diplomatic relations with Great
Britain, although the presence of 1600 British troops in Belize calmed
the local fears of an invasion. 204 The new Guatemalan position was
based on the argument that the heads of agreement were not upheld in the
proposed constitution (in response to the internal pressure in Belize),
and that Great Britain had also changed its Position. 205 On September 21, 1981, Belize became independent; within a week Belize became the
156th member of the United Nations by a vote of 144 to 1 (Guatemala
casting the negative vote).206
Clearly there is an active dispute over the maritime area between
Guatemala, Belize and Honduras.
roughly the area involved.

The shaded area on Figure 13 shows

Since the dispute is so deeply engrained in

the politics of the region, resolution is not likely to occur before OTEC
commercialization is realized. As a result the export of OTEC technology
to this region should not be considered. The remaining area on Figure 13,
however, has good OTEC potential and is apparently free from jurisdictional conflict.
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Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis as stated in the introduction was to
identify those areas in the Caribbean Sea where maritime boundary
disputes pose a potential constraint to the

commercializatio~

The study was based upon several assumptions.

of OTEC.

First, OTEC will become a

commercially viable, exportable technology within the decade. Second,
the law of the sea regarding the nature and extent of coastal state
jurisdiction has essentially stabilized in recent years, establishing a
multiple zone regime which includes national resource rights out to 200
miles from shore. The third assumption is that the international law
regarding maritime boundary delimitation is not a universally accepted,
systematic body of rules, which implies that prolonged disagreement may
exist especially where there are unique circumstances and where the
boundary results in the division of valuable resources. These assumptions were supported in the first three chapters.
The concept of OTEC is a century old.

However, since other energy

alternatives were more readily available and less costly to develop, OTEC
was not given much attention until the 1970·s.

Since the initiation of

the U.S. OTEC development program in 1972, considerable progress has been
made toward increasing the economic competitiveness of OTEC, and eliminating the technological obstacles. At this time, all the technology is
available for generating electricity from the ocean thermal gradient.
The construction and deployment of initial large-scale pilot plants,
scheduled for the mid-1980·s, will be the instrumental factor in
eliminating the perceived risk among the financial community, enabling
progress into the commercial phase. The Federal government has taken the
steps to assist the OTEC interests in reaching that point where private
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industry can make a "go-no go" decision.

There is an air of increasing

confidence and optimism among those who have been involved in OTEC
development over the past decade that when the decision point is reached,
the financial community will find OTEC to be a favorable option.
The 1970's was also a period of transition in the law of the sea.
Since the early part of the 20th century, many coastal states had desired
to extend their jur'isdiction seaward, beyond the traditional "three-mile
limit." This movement was opposed by the maritime powers who wished to
preserve the maximum possible access to ocean areas.

However, by the

early 1970's,a majority of states (including many newly-independent
nations) had unilaterally, or as regional groups, claimed jurisdiction
seaward to 200 miles from the shoreline.

By the time the Third UN Confer-

ence on the Law of the Sea was convened, the "200 mile limit" was already
becoming an element of customary international law. The Exclusive Economic lone provision, which grants each coastal state sovereign rights to
explore and exploit the resources within 200 miles of its shore, has been
one of the least controversial elements at the decade- long UNCLOS II:
meetings.

Included in this provision is the sovereign right to exploit

the energy resources of the "water, currents, and winds" in the EEl.
However, this element of the law does not totally eliminate the
potential for disputes over maritime areas, especially when there is a
valuable resource, such as a rich thermal gradient, between opposite or
adjacent countries.

In other words, when countries are less than 400

miles apart across an expanse of ocean, or where neighboring countries
need to delimit the lateral EEl boundary extending from the termination
of their land border, there is a possibility that a boundary dispute may
arise.

Despite the efforts of the negotiators at UNCLOS III to define
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the law of maritime boundary delimitation, there is still no systematic
set of rules which can be applied in every case.
upon whether or not

th~

The controversy centers

concept of "equitable principles," or the strict

application of the "equidistance method," with exceptions allowed only in
certain "special circumstances," takes precedence in the delimitation.
As a consequence of this controversy, the potential still exists for
prolonged maritime boundary disputes. Additionally, as countries begin
to realize the economic value of the waters

of~

their shores (through the

commercialization of OTEC), this dispute potential will increase because
those countries will be more reluctant to relinquish their maritime
claims •
. In the Caribbean Sea, there is no maritime space which exists further
than 200 miles from some land territory.

This fact means that 55-60

maritime boundaries will have to be negotiated.

Considering the fact

that there is OTEC potential throughout the region, any boundary negotiations will have important economic implications for the countries
involved.

The effect of any boundary disputes will be that OTEC facility

deployment will be constrained in the areas in question.
The fourth and fifth Chapters represent the analysis section, where
the extent of the boundary disputes is identified.
dispute areas were found ,to exist.

Nine potential

Five of these involved disputed

titles to sovereignty over small, and mostly uninhabited islands. All of
the issues arise from the presence of "special circumstances" such as
remote islands or an unusual curvature of the coastline.

In most cases

the issues affect more than one country even though particular disputes
are bilateral. Generally, the disputed areas do not cover a significant
portion of the potential OTEC resource of the countries involved except
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for Nicaragua, Guatemala, Venezuela and Colombia.
of this analysis.

Figure 14 is a summary

The shading shows that area where there is an OTEC

resource (beyond a generalized 100m contour) and where there are no known
jurisdictional disputes.
As the Caribbean countries and island territories become aware of the
potential economic benefits resulting from the exploitation of the
thermal resource, they are likely to become more assertive in their
maritime claims. This will have the effect of prolonging the disputes
over maritime areas.

In addition, new disputes, not identified in this

analysis, may arise in areas which have previously been essentially
ignored.

The effect of these intensified conflicts on OTEC is that the

security of the facilities will be reduced.

Thus, in planning a

commercialization strategy, the areas identified in this thesis should be
excluded from consideration for early plant deployment.
This thesis also demonstrates that similar analyses should be
conducted for other areas of the world where OTEC commercialization is
envisioned.

Perhaps the best thing that could happen is that OTEC

potential be turned from a negative force (fueling boundary conflicts)
into a positive force, a "carrot before the cart," to lead countries to
cooperate in bringing the conflicts to quick resolution so that they may
mutually benefit from this promising new technology.

The development of

a regional OTEC development organization might provide the mechanism by
whichthes~

conflicts can be avoided; however, based upon the lack of

success experienced by other regional developmental organizations this
option will not likely eliminate the maritime boundary dispute potential
which exists in the region.
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